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The recent financial crisis and subsequent regulatory changes on over-the-
counter (OTC) markets have given rise to the new valuation and trading
frameworks for defaultable claims to investors and dealer banks. More OTC
market participants have adopted the new market conventions that incorpo-
rate counterparty risk into the valuation of OTC derivatives. In addition,
the use of collateral has become common for most bilateral trades to reduce
counterparty default risk. On the other hand, to increase transparency and
market stability, the U.S and European regulators have required mandatory
clearing of defaultable derivatives through central counterparties. This disser-
tation tackles these changes and analyze their impacts on the pricing, trading
and clearing of defaultable claims.
In the first part of the thesis, we study a valuation framework for finan-
cial contracts subject to reference and counterparty default risks with col-
lateralization requirement. We propose a fixed point approach to analyze the
mark-to-market contract value with counterparty risk provision, and show that
it is a unique bounded and continuous fixed point via contraction mapping.
This leads us to develop an accurate iterative numerical scheme for valuation.
Specifically, we solve a sequence of linear inhomogeneous partial differential
equations, whose solutions converge to the fixed point price function. We
apply our methodology to compute the bid and ask prices for both default-
able equity and fixed-income derivatives, and illustrate the non-trivial effects
of counterparty risk, collateralization ratio and liquidation convention on the
bid-ask prices.
In the second part, we study the problem of pricing and trading of default-
able claims among investors with heterogeneous risk preferences and market
views. Based on the utility-indifference pricing methodology, we construct the
bid-ask spreads for risk-averse buyers and sellers, and show that the spreads
widen as risk aversion or trading volume increases. Moreover, we analyze the
buyer’s optimal static trading position under various market settings, includ-
ing (i) when the market pricing rule is linear, and (ii) when the counterparty –
single or multiple sellers – may have different nonlinear pricing rules generated
by risk aversion and belief heterogeneity. For defaultable bonds and credit de-
fault swaps, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal trading positions,
and examine the combined effect of heterogeneous risk aversions and beliefs.
In particular, we find that belief heterogeneity, rather than the difference in
risk aversion, is crucial to trigger a trade.
Finally, we study the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap
(CDS) market. Central clearing of CDS through a central counterparty (CCP)
has been proposed as a tool for mitigating systemic risk and counterpart risk in
the CDS market. The design of CCPs involves the implementation of margin
requirements and a default fund, for which various designs have been proposed.
We propose a mathematical model to quantify the impact of the design of the
CCP on the incentive for clearing and analyze the market equilibrium. We
determine the minimum number of clearing participants required so that they
have an incentive to clear part of their exposures. Furthermore, we analyze
the equilibrium CDS positions and their dependence on the initial margin,
risk aversion, and counterparty risk in the inter-dealer market. Our numerical
results show that minimizing the initial margin maximizes the total clearing
positions as well as the CCP’s revenue.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Pricing of Defaultable Claims with Counterparty Risk and Col-
lateralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Trading of Defaultable Claims with Risk Aversion and Belief
Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Impact of central counterparty design on the credit default swap
market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Pricing of Defaultable Claims with Counterparty Risk and
Collateralization 15
2.1 Model Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Mark-to-Market Value with Counterparty Risk Provision 17
2.1.2 Bid-Ask Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Fixed Point Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1 Contraction Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.2 Numerical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Defaultable Equity Derivatives with Counterparty Risk . . . . 30
2.3.1 Call Spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Equity Forwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.3 Claims with Positive Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Defaultable Fixed-Income Derivatives with Counterparty Risk 42
i
2.4.1 Credit Default Swaps (CDS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.2 Total Return Swaps (TRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 Trading of Defaultable Claims under Risk Aversion and Belief
Heterogeneity 50
3.1 Problem Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.1 Optimal Trading with Linear Prices . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1.2 Optimal Trading with Heterogenous Sellers . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Utility-Indifference Pricing and Optimal Trading of Defaultable
Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 Bid-Ask Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.2 Optimal Trading with Linear Prices . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.3 Optimal Trading with a Single Seller . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.4 Optimal Trading with Multiple Sellers . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Utility-Indifference Pricing and Optimal Trading of CDS . . . 77
3.3.1 Bid-Ask Upfront Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.2 Optimal Trading with Linear Upfront Prices . . . . . . 83
3.3.3 Optimal Trading with a Single Seller . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3.4 Optimal Trading with Multiple Sellers . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.5 Bid-Ask Premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4 Impact of Central Counterparty Design on the Credit Default
Swap Market 94
4.1 Equilibrium of the CDS Inter-Dealer Market . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.1.1 Design of the CCP’s Capital Structure . . . . . . . . . 95
4.1.2 Mean-Variance Optimization of Dealers . . . . . . . . . 98
4.1.3 Inter-Dealer Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
ii
4.2 Two Heterogeneous Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.1 Inter-Dealer Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.2 Impact of Initial Margin Level Change on Equilibrium 105
4.3 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4 Optimal Design of CCPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Bibliography 110
A Proofs for Chapter 2 118
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B Proofs for Chapter 4 123
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
iii
List of Figures
1.1 The U.S. CDS market breakdowns (in US$ billion) . . . . . . 9
1.2 The U.S. CDS market with a CCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 The waterfall capital structure of a CCP . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 The MtM values of a call spread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 The MtM values of a call spread in terms of λ(2) and λ(1) . . . 34
2.3 The MtM values of a call spread in terms of δ(2) and c1 . . . . 35
2.4 The bid ask prices of a call spread with counterparty risk pro-
vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 The MtM value of a stock forward in terms of spot price and λ(2) 39
2.6 The bid prices of a call option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 The CDS upfront prices under the CIR model . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 The CDS and TRS bid-aks upfront prices under the CIR model 48
3.1 The buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices in terms of trading
volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The buyer’s and seller’s option positions . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with the linear bid-
ask prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 The buyer’s optimal positions with a single seller . . . . . . . 68
3.5 The buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers . . . . . . . . . 75
3.6 The buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers . . . . . . . . . 76
iv
3.7 The indifference upfronts in terms of trading volume . . . . . 82
3.8 The buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with linear bid-ask
upfronts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.9 The CDS buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with a single
dealer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.10 The CDS buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers . . . . . . 90
4.1 The minimum number of dealers for a non-trivial equilibrium 108
4.2 Equilibrium positions for different funding rates and guaranty
fund default probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3 The minimum number of dealers for a non-trivial equilibrium 109
4.4 The minimum number of dealers in a group for condition (4.27) 110
4.5 The CCP’s optimal margin level and optimal revenue . . . . . 111
v
List of Tables
2.1 Summary of notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Convergence of the MtM values of a call spread . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Convergence of the MtM values of a forward . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Convergence of the MtM values of a CDS . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 The CDS gross notionals of clearing members (in US$ million)
on September 9th, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
vi
Acknowledgments
This dissertation summarizes my past five year research in Columbia Univer-
sity. I would not have had this achievement, if I had not learnt from, worked
with, and supported by the best scholars and colleagues in the field of my
study. I feel very privileged to have such a great opportunity has led to my
academic, professional and personal growths.
First of all, I express my deepest gratitude to my academic advisor Pro-
fessor Tim Leung for guiding, advising and motivating me. I still vividly re-
member the first day of his advanced financial engineering class two years ago
where he passionately brought his fresh research ideas and intellectually mo-
tivated me and my fellow Ph.D. students to find our research topics. Since we
started doing research together, he has always brought new ideas and frank
feedback to me in every single meeting, may it be in the morning, evening
or past midnight. I was not only impressed by his great insight and acute
knowledge of quantitative finance but also by his incessant effort in pursuit of
academic excellence as a scholar. Every time when I was stuck or confronted
challenges, he advised and motivated me to break through the obstacles and
achieve the goals. Once again, I deeply thank him for his sincere advice and
support as my academic advisor.
I am also very grateful to my dissertation committee: Professors Ward
Whitt, Karl Sigman, Xuedong He from the Industrial Engineering and Oper-
ations Research Department at Columbia University and Hongzhong Zhang
from Statistics Department at Columbia University. I also want to express my
vii
gratitude to my previous academic advisor Professor Rama Cont who is now
in Imperial College London. Our research output is one of the important parts
of my thesis.
Through my past five years in Columbia University, I have really enjoyed
my responsibilities as a teaching assistant for many graduate courses in our
financial engineering master program. We all know the the often-referenced
quote ”the best way to learn is to teach.” By having office-hours, making ex-
ams and problems, and solving them to students, I have learned more than I
expected. Thanks to Professors Martin Haugh, Jose Blanchet, Daniel Bien-
stock, Rama Cont, Xuedong He, David Yao and Ali Sadighian for providing
those precious opportunities.
Columbia University has provided me plenty of advanced lectures which
are uniquely designed for quantitative finance. The first two years of intense
courseworks including probability, stochastic processes, optimization, statis-
tics, mathematical finance and financial engineering have equipped me with a
solid foundation for conducing my research toward this dissertation. Thanks to
Professors Jose Blanchet, Emmanuel Derman, Gerardo Hernandez-del-Valle,
David Yao, Donald Goldfarb, Karl Sigman, Ciamac Moallemi, Daniel Bien-
stock, Assaf Zeevi, Ioannis Karatzas, Jingchen Liu, Philip Protter, Martin
Haugh and Tim Leung for sharing me their knowledge and passion for aca-
demic research.
I cannot imagine the life at Columbia without my precious friends and
colleagues. Thanks to my beloved friends Tulia Herrera, Hailey Songhee
Kim, Irene Song, Shyam Sundar Chandramouli, Chen Chen, Xinyun Traci
Chen, Yupeng Chen, Jing Dong, Juan Li, Peter Maceli, Zhen Rhea Qiu and
Chun Wang. We went through our academic journeys including our qualify-
ing exam period by cheering each others. I also thank to my officemates and
beloved friends Haowen Zhong, Andrew Jooyong Ahn, Rodrigo Carrasco, Fabio
viii
D’Andreagiovanni, Yixi Shi, Antoine Desir, Gonzalo Ignacio Munoz Martinez,
Chun Ye, Xingbo Xu, Cecilia Zenteno, Matthieu Plumettaz and Tony Qin. I
also share my precious memories in New York and Paris with my dear friends
Jaehyun Cho, Rishi Talreja, Daniela Wachholtz, Lakshithe Wagalath, Alex
Michalka, John Zheng, Andrei Simion, Aya Wallwater, Yunan Liu, Marco San-
toli, Yori Zwols, Amel Bentata, Romain Deguest, Rouba Ibrahim, Yu Hang
Kan, Adrien de Larrard and Thiam Hui Lee.
Finally, I really appreciate the support of my family, Dr. Youngwhan Kim,
Soonkyu Park and Jinhee Kim. I am always proud of being one of our family
members. Also I express my special thanks to Jessica Seungeun Lee who
always supported me and shared her busiest time with me. Lastly, I show
my gratitude to Samsung Scholarship which has financially supported in the
past five years. They not only provided the support but only shared their vast





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
The outstanding notional amount for derivatives traded in the global over-
the-counter (OTC) markets has increased drastically from US$142 trillion in
December 2002 to US$693 trillion as of December 2012.1 A great variety of
contracts are traded in these markets, including interest rate swaps, equity-
linked contracts, credit derivatives, and foreign exchange derivatives. Associ-
ated with each OTC-traded contract, there is a bilateral agreement between
traders on the price, quantity, and contractual features. As such, the defaults
of counterparties can significantly affect the future cash flow of the contract.
During the 2008 financial crisis, a number of large financial institutions, in-
cluding Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and American International Group
(AIG), defaulted on their OTC contracts, such as credit default swaps, caus-
ing great losses to their counterparties. In view of these events, new regulations
and market conventions have been introduced to incorporate counterparty risk
into the valuations of OTC derivatives.
OTC traders commonly update the prices of every traded contract on a
daily basis. To this end, they typically develop pricing models which capture
1According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistical release available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc hy1311.pdf
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the changing market conditions and various risk factors affecting the future
cash flow of the contract. The daily estimated price of a contract is called the
mark-to-market (MtM) value. For any contract, the MtM value depends not
only on the stochastic dynamics of underlying assets, but also on the counter-
parties’ changing creditworthiness. According to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS),2 two-thirds of counterparty risk losses during the crisis were
from counterparty risk adjustments in MtM valuations whereas the rest were
due to actual defaults. As a result, recent regulatory changes, such as Basel
III, incorporate the counterparty risk adjustments in the calculation of capital
requirements.
Among all OTC-traded derivatives, credit default swaps have played an
important role in the 2008 financial crisis. One notable market phenomenon
is the significant widening of their bid-ask spreads during market turbulence.
Moreover, higher bid-ask spreads are typically coupled with lower trading vol-
umes. From an OTC trader’s perspective, the optimal trading position would
depend on the trader’s risk attitude and market outlook. This has motivated
the recent development of pricing models that incorporate potentially different
risk preferences and market views into bilateral trading of credit default swaps
and other defaultable claims.
On top of pricing issues, more institutional market participants, such as
investment banks, have recently started to trade credit default swaps through
a central counterparty. A central counterparty stands between any two market
participants, acting as the seller to the original buyer and as the buyer to the
original seller. As a result, the original contract between the two participants
into two contracts with the central counterparty. This mechanism is called
central clearing. An important function of the central counterparty is to fulfill
the entire financial obligations of any defaulting clearing members, and thus,
2See BIS press release at http://www.bis.org/press/p110601.pdf
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reduce the impact of counterparty risk in OTC trading. In order to become
a clearing member, a market participant needs to deposit collateral and pay
clearing fees. These two features can affect market participants’ incentive to
use the clearing service. This gives rise to the problem of understanding the
impact of central counterparty policy on the clearing volume of credit default
swaps.
Motivated by these observations, we study the issues of pricing, trading and
clearing of OTC-traded derivatives in this thesis. In the subsequent sections,
we provide a brief summary of our methodologies and related studies for each
of these three problems.
1.1 Pricing of Defaultable Claims with Coun-
terparty Risk and Collateralization
As a measure to reduce counterparty risk, the use of collateral has also in-
creased dramatically in the OTC markets over the years. According to the sur-
vey conducted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
in 2013,3 the percentage of all trades subject to collateral agreements in the
OTC market increases from 30% in 2003 to 73.7% in 2013. OTC market par-
ticipants continue to adapt collateralization and counterparty risk adjustments
in their valuation methodologies for various contracts. In Chapter 2, we dis-
cuss a valuation framework for financial contracts subject to counterparty risk
and collateralization.
When an OTC market participant trades a financial claim with a counter-
party, the participant is exposed not only to the price change and default risk
of the underlying asset but also to the default risk of the counterparty. To
3Survey available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-
surveys/
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reflect the counterparty default risk in MtM valuations, three adjustments are
calculated in addition to the counterparty-risk free value of the claim. While
credit valuation adjustment (CVA) accounts for the possibility of the counter-
party’s default, debt valuation adjustment (DVA) is calculated to adjust for
the participant’s own default risk. In addition, collateral interest payments
and the cost of borrowing generate funding valuation adjustment (FVA). The
bilateral credit value adjustment (BCVA) incorporates all three components.
We consider two current market conventions for price computation. The
main difference in the two conventions rises in the assumption of the liquidation
value – either counterparty risk-free value or MtM value with counterparty risk
provision – upon default. Brigo et al. [2012] and Brigo and Morini [2011] show
that the values under the two conventions have significant differences and large
impacts on net debtors and creditors.
With counterparty risk provision, the MtM contract value is defined implic-
itly in terms of a risk-neutral expectation. This gives rise to major challenges
in analyzing and computing the MtM value. We propose a novel fixed point
approach to analyze this problem. A key feature of our methodology is to
show that the MtM value is the unique fixed point of a contraction mapping.
We analytically construct a sequence of price functions, which are the classical
solutions of a sequence of inhomogeneous linear partial differential equations
(PDEs), that converges to the fixed point. This approach also directly sug-
gests an iterative numerical scheme to compute the MtM values of a variety
of financial claims under different market conventions.
In related studies, Fujii and Takahashi [2013] incorporate BCVA and un-
der/over collateralization, and calculate the MtM value by simulation. Henry-
Laborde`re [2012] approximates the MtM value by numerically solving a related
nonlinear PDE through simulation of a marked branching diffusion, and pro-
vides conditions to avoid a “blow-up” of the simulated solution. Burgard and
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Kjaer [2011] also consider a similar nonlinear PDE and they compute the
BCVA for defaultable bonds. In contrast, our fixed point methodology works
directly with the price definition in terms of a recursive expectation, rather
than heuristically stating and solving a nonlinear PDE. Our contraction map-
ping result allows us to solve a series of linear PDE problems with bounded
classical solutions, and obtain a unique bounded continuous MtM value as a
result.
Our model also provides insight on the bid-ask prices of various financial
contracts. The CVA or BCVA is asymmetric for the buyer and the seller. As
such, the incorporation of adjustment to unilateral or bilateral counterparty
risk leads to a non-zero bid-ask spread. In other words, counterparty risk re-
veals itself as a market friction, resulting in a transaction cost for OTC trades.
In addition, we examine the impact of various parameters such as default rate,
recovery rate, collateralization ratio and effective collateral interest rate. We
find that a higher counterparty default rate and funding cost reduce the MtM
value, whereas the market participant’s own default rate and collateralization
ratio have positive price effects. For claims with a positive payoff, such as calls
and puts, we establish a number of price dominance relationships. In partic-
ular, when collateral rates are low, the bid-ask prices are dominated by the
counterparty risk-free value. Moreover, the bid-ask prices decrease when we
use the MtM value rather than counterparty risk-free value for the liquidation
value upon default.
1.2 Trading of Defaultable Claims with Risk
Aversion and Belief Heterogeneity
For defaultable claims, such as corporate bonds and credit default swaps, the
risks associated with defaults may not be perfectly hedged. In order to value
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a defaultable claim, the buyer and seller must quantify the unhedgeable risk
based on their partial hedging strategies, subjective market views, and risk
preferences. In particular, risk preferences and market views are absent in the
classical no-arbitrage pricing framework. In Chapter 3, we propose a utility-
indifference approach to study the buyer’s and seller’s pricing rules as well as
their optimal trading strategies.
The utility-indifference pricing approach has been applied to credit deriva-
tives valuations in Bielecki and Jeanblanc [2006]; Jaimungal and Sigloch [2012];
Leung et al. [2008]; Shouda [2006]; Sircar and Zariphopoulou [2010], among
others. Nevertheless, most existing indifference pricing models commonly fo-
cus on the perspective of a single derivative buyer or seller, and do not address
the natural question of how multiple risk-averse market participants trade
among each other.
Working with exponential utility, we obtain explicit formulas for non-linear
bid-ask prices for both defaultable bonds and credit default swaps. Moreover,
we prove that the buyers’ indifference prices are strictly concave in trading
volume, whereas the sellers’ indifference prices are strictly convex in trading
volume. Also, we obtain asymptotic results of the buyer’s and seller’s average
bid-ask prices in terms of risk aversion and trading volume. As either risk-
aversion or trading volume goes to zero, the average bid-ask prices converge to
a single value called zero risk-aversion price. This zero risk-aversion price plays
a critical role to initiate a trade. On the other hand, as either risk-aversion
or trading volume goes to infinity, the average bid-ask prices converge to the
no-arbitrage lower bound and upper bound respectively.
We analyze the optimal static trading strategy to maximize the investor’s
benefit defined by the spread between his/her indifference price and the offered
prices under two market scenarios, namely, (i) when the offered prices are linear
in quantity, and (ii) when the offered prices are the indifference prices set by
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the sellers with their heterogeneous risk aversions and beliefs. By using the
concavity/convexity property of the indifference prices, we derive formulas for
the optimal trading positions of defaultable claims and examine the impact of
default risk, risk aversion, and other parameters.
Moreover, our results also help explain the various effects of risk aversion in
the trading of defaultable claims. For instance, we show precisely how bid-ask
spread widens as risk aversion or trading volume increases. This is consistent
with empirical studies that calibrate the risk aversion from market option
prices (see, for example, Jackwerth [2000]). Intuitively, a less risk-averse seller
tends to offer more competitive prices and gains a larger share of the investor’s
total trading volume. Nevertheless, accumulating a large position also in effect
makes the seller become more risk-averse and price less aggressively. Hence,
the buyer’s optimal position and trading price depend directly on the risk
aversion of all sellers.
Furthermore, in establishing the trade/no-trade condition, a special role
is played by the zero risk-aversion indifference price limits. The investor’s
zero risk-aversion price is directly linked to the investor’s belief on the market
conditions and default risk. In the optimal trading problem, a buyer will
purchase from a seller if and only if the buyer’s zero risk-aversion price (with
respect to the buyer’s belief) exceeds the seller’s. In other words, heterogeneity
in beliefs, rather than in risk aversion, is crucial to initiate a trade. If a trade
occurs, then the optimal trading position of the investor is determined from
maximizing the spread between the buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices.
In a recent related work, German [2011] considers a utility maximization
approach to study the trading of a large trader. Garleanu et al. [2009] apply a
utility maximization approach to study the demand-pressure effect on option
prices. Under exponential utility, he provides a recursive unique pricing rule
for an illiquid asset. In our model, we also work with exponential utility,
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along with a parametric credit risk model rather than a general semimartingale
market. As such, our model yields analytic formulas for the indifference prices
and optimal trading strategies, and allows for different beliefs among market
participants.
There is also a wealth of literature that investigates the influence of het-
erogeneous risk preferences and beliefs on equilibrium asset prices. Among
others, Scheinkman and Xiong [2003] study the equilibrium prices and the for-
mation of speculative bubbles under a parameterized model of heterogeneous
beliefs. Cvitanic´ et al. [2012] derive an equilibrium model when investors
have heterogeneous beliefs, risk aversions and time preference rates. Gomes
and Michaelides [2008] and Chabakauri [2010] study the market equilibrium
with heterogeneous agents under various frictions such as uninsurable income
shocks, borrowing or risk constraints. Glosten and Milgrom [1985] show that
the presence of traders with superior information can lead to a positive bid-ask
spread.
There is relatively less research on equilibrium trading volume for options
and other financial derivatives. Benninga and Mayshar [2000] demonstrate
that implied volatility smiles can be generated at equilibrium when options are
traded among heterogeneous agents. Carr and Madan [2001] analyze the opti-
mal position in a stock and the corresponding European options, and find that
heterogeneity in preferences or beliefs induces investors to take a long/short
position in derivatives. Cassano [2002] incorporates volatility disagreement
among traders and examines the effect of disagreement on equilibrium option
trading volume. Xiong and Yan [2010] present an equilibrium model of bond
markets in which two groups of agents hold heterogeneous expectations about
future economic conditions. In our model, we obtain the equilibrium trad-
ing volume and bid-ask spreads for both defaultable bonds and credit default
swaps in a market with multiple traders with heterogeneous risk aversions and











Figure 1.1: The U.S. CDS market breakdowns (in US$ billion)
The outstanding notional amounts of inter-dealer contracts and client-dealer con-
tracts. Source: The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, March 2012.
beliefs.
1.3 Impact of central counterparty design on
the credit default swap market
In the current financial market, institutional investors (clients) buy or sell
credit default swaps (CDS) from dealers representing major investment banks.
In order to hedge their client-dealer positions, CDS dealers establish opposite
positions with other dealers in the so-called inter-dealer market. Figure 1.1
shows the breakdowns of the U.S. CDS market in terms of outstanding notional
amounts.
As is well known, CDS have been repeatedly blamed for causing and ex-
acerbating the credit crisis. The complexity and limited transparency of CDS
market have made it difficult especially for CDS dealers to accurately estimate



























Figure 1.2: The U.S. CDS market with a CCP
The U.S. CDS market consists of two type of contracts: inter-dealer contracts and
client-dealer contracts. The circle represents the inter-dealer market. After 2009,
all inter-dealer market contracts are cleared through a CCP.
the values of their CDS portfolios. On June 17, 2009, the U.S. Treasury De-
partment released a comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposal that
would mandate the clearing of inter-dealer CDS contracts through a regulated
and qualified central counterparty (CCP).4 We refer the readers to Stephen et
al. [2009], Cont [2010] and Duffie et al. [2010] for more details on the recent reg-
ulatory changes in the CDS market. After these changes, all inter-dealer CDS
contracts have been cleared in CCPs. Figure 1.2 illustrates the mechanism of
central clearing through a CCP.
The main function of a CCP is to assume all the losses whenever clearing
members fail to meet their contractual obligations. After every default event,
4“A new foundation: Rebuilding financial supervision and regulation.” Financial Regu-
latory Reform, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009.
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the defaulted members’ entire clearing positions are auctioned to the remaining
members, and the total of the winning bids is the cost of unwinding to the
CCP. Since this unwinding process may take five days or more, the CCP is
exposed to price fluctuations of the unwinding positions during this period.
If the CCP is unable to fulfill this obligation, then many clearing dealers are
subject to losses. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain sufficient amount of
financial resources for the CCP.
The CCP collects its capital in different ways, such as variation margins,
initial margins, and guaranty fund contributions, from its clearing members.
The size of each market participant’s initial margin and guaranty fund con-
tribution is reassessed by the CCP on a regular basis according to market
conditions and members’ outstanding positions. The CCP also adopts a wa-
terfall structure, which determines the order of absorbing losses in response to
defaults of clearing members. Let us explain this mechanism of each capital
layer as follows.
• Variation margin, also known as maintenance margin, is exchanged
between the CCP and every clearing member on a daily basis. The
variation margin payment is exactly the daily change in the MtM value
of the clearing member’s position. As such, it absorbs the short-term
losses and first losses when a clearing member defaults.
• Initial margin, also known as the risk margin, is provided by both clear-
ing members when a trade is cleared with the CCP. This cash amount
will be deposited in the CCP until either the contract expires at matu-
rity, or is unwound before maturity. Its main purpose is to absorb the
cost of unwinding a defaulting clearing member’s positions by the CCP.
• Guaranty fund, also known as default fund, is a pool of capital con-
tributed by all the CCP’s clearing members. This absorbs the losses
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Guarantee fund from 
non-defaulting 
participants
CCP’s capitalVariation margin from defaulting participant
Net liability of the defaulting 
participant's positions at 
default time
Decrease in value of the 
defaulting participant’s 
positions during unwind
Total net liability of the defaulting participant’s 
positions determined from auction
Figure 1.3: The waterfall capital structure of a CCP
The gray area represents the net liability of the defaulting member at its default
time. The initial net liability is covered by the variation margin and part of the
initial margin of the defaulting member. The shaded area represents the decrease in
the value of the defaulting member’s positions during the unwinding process. It is
covered by the initial margin and the guaranty fund contribution of the defaulting
member, and also part of the guaranty fund contribution of non-defaulting members.
in excess of the defaulting members’ variation and initial margins. The
defaulted members’ portion of the guaranty fund is always used to cover
the excess losses, followed by the rest of the guaranty fund. This risk
sharing feature is the main source of counterparty risk among clearing
members in the central clearing process.
• CCP’s capital is the capital of last resort to absorb the losses due to
clearing members’ defaults.
To summarize, Figure 1.3 illustrates how a CCP orderly allocates its financial
resources to absorb losses.
In Chapter 4, we propose a mathematical model to study the equilibrium
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demand for clearing CDS among dealers. Our model incorporates various
costs and counterparty risks faced by the clearing members (dealers), and
also quantify the hedging benefits of clearing through a CCP. Given its ini-
tial client-dealer position, each CDS dealer’s problem is to choose the optimal
positions with other dealers in order to maximize the expected returns from
their respective CDS portfolios, subject to variance risk constraints. The mar-
ket equilibrium is found from the market clearing condition whereby the sum
of all dealers’ optimal (long/short) positions equals to zero. We prove that
there exists a unique market equilibrium described by the number of clearing
members and their CDS positions. We obtain closed formulas that allow us to
study the sensitivities of the equilibrium with respect to model parameters. In
particular, we determine the minimum number of CDS dealers in the market
to guarantee that the overall demand for clearing is strictly positive. We also
find that the CCP can increase the total clearing positions and its profit by
reducing its initial margin level.
There is a growing literature on analyzing the roles of CCPs in the OTC
markets. Cont [2010] and Stephen et al. [2009] argue qualitatively that in-
troduction of well-designed CCPs can not only increase market transparency,
but also help improve the management of counterparty risk and systemic risk.
In a general equilibrium setting, Acharya and Bisin [2010] compare OTC and
centralized markets. They show that OTC markets yield a counterparty risk
externality that leads to ex-ante productive inefficiency. However, this exter-
nality is absent in a centralized market that provides transparency of trading
positions. Duffie and Zhu [2011] show that adding a CCP to an existing
central clearing system can lead to an increase in average exposure to counter-
party default based on the assumption that each clearing member’s exposure
is independent and normally distributed. They propose that a single CCP
should clear credit derivatives and interest-rate derivatives altogether. On the
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other hand, Cont and Kokholm [2013] extend their model by incorporating a
more sophisticated joint distribution for the exposures of clearing members.
In contrast to Duffie and Zhu [2011], they find that clearing of interest rate
and credit derivatives separately by two different CCPs can reduce overall ex-
posures. Compared to these models, our framework accounts for the CCP’s
capital structure, including initial margins, variation margins, and guaranty
fund contributions from its clearing members. We also provide an analysis on
the design of a CCP and its impact on the market equilibrium.
Haene and Sturm [2009] conclude that establishing guaranty fund is al-
ways optimal for dealers assuming only one representative clearing member.
However, they do not explain the impact of the allocation change on dealer’s
inter-dealer market CDS demand. Fontaine et al. [2011] derive the optimal
inter-dealer market CDS demand of dealers and corresponding equilibrium
price based on a circular structure of clients’ demand given as the dealers’
endowments. Nevertheless, among a number of limitations, their model does
not explain or include any counterparty risks that arise from CDS trading.
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Chapter 2
Pricing of Defaultable Claims
with Counterparty Risk and
Collateralization
In this chapter, we study a valuation framework for defaultable claims subject
to counterparty default risk under collateralization. By using a fixed point
approach and contraction mapping, we show that the MtM contract value
with counterparty risk provision is a unique bounded and continuous fixed
point. To numerically obtain the fixed point value, we devise an accurate
iterative algorithm which solves a sequence of linear inhomogeneous PDEs,
whose solutions converge to the fixed point. For applications, we numerically
compute the bid and ask prices for defaultable claims with counterparty risk
provision and analyze the impact of parameters such as counterparty risk,
collateralization ratio and effective collateral rates on the bid-ask prices.
In Section 2.1, we formulate the MtM valuation of a generic financial claim
with default risk and counterparty default risks under collateralization. In
Section 2.2, we provide a fixed point theorem and a recursive algorithm for
valuation. In Section 2.3, we compute the MtM values of various default-
CHAPTER 2. PRICING OF DEFAULTABLE CLAIMS WITH
COUNTERPARTY RISK AND COLLATERALIZATION 16
able equity claims and derive their bid-ask prices. In Section 2.4, we apply
our model to price a number of defaultable fixed-income claims. Section 2.5
concludes this chapter, and Appendix A contains a number of longer proofs.
2.1 Model Formulation
In the background, we fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Q), where Q is the risk-
neutral pricing measure. In our model, there are three defaultable parties: a
reference entity, a market participant, and a counterparty dealer. We denote
them respectively as parties 0, 1, and 2. The default time τi of party i ∈
{0, 1, 2} is modeled by the first jump time of an exogenous doubly stochastic
Poisson process. Precisely, we define
τi = inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λ(i)u du > Ei
}
, (2.1)
where {Ei}i=0,1,2 are unit exponential random variables that are independent
of the intensity processes (λ
(i)
t )t≥0, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Throughout, each intensity
process is assumed to be of Markovian form λ
(i)
t ≡ λ(i)(t, St, Xt) for some
bounded positive function λ(i)(t, s, x), and is driven by the pre-default stock
price S and the stochastic factor X satisfying the SDEs
dSt = (r(t,Xt) + λ
(0)(t, St, Xt))St dt+ σ(t, St)St dWt , (2.2)
dXt = b(t,Xt) dt+ η(t,Xt) dW˜t . (2.3)
Here, (Wt)t≥0 and (W˜t)t≥0 are standard Brownian motions under Q with an
instantaneous correlation parameter ρ ∈ (−1, 1). The risk-free interest rate is
denoted by rt ≡ r(t,Xt) for some bounded positive function. At the default
time τ0, the stock price will jump to value zero and remain worthless after-
wards. This “jump-to-default model” for S is a variation of those by Merton
[1976], Carr and Linetsky [2006], and Mendoza-Arriaga and Linetsky [2011].
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2.1.1 Mark-to-Market Value with Counterparty Risk
Provision
A defaultable claim is described by the triplet (g, h, l), where g(ST , XT ) is the
payoff at maturity T , (h(St, Xt))0≤t≤T is the dividend process, and l(τ0, Xτ0) is
the payoff at the default time τ0 of the reference entity. We assume continuous
collateralization which is a reasonable proxy for the current market where
daily or intraday margin calls are common [see Fujii and Takahashi, 2013].
For party i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by δi the collateral coverage ratio of the
claim’s MtM value. We use the range 0 ≤ δi ≤ 120% since dealers usually
require over-collateralization up to 120% for credit or equity linked notes [see
Ramaswamy, 2011, Table 1].
We first consider pricing of a defaultable claim without bilateral counter-
party risk. We call this value counterparty-risk free (CRF) value. Precisely,
the ex-dividend pre-default CRF value of the defaultable claim with (g, h, l) is
given by























The shorthand notation Et,s,x[ · ] := E[ · |St = s, Xt = x ] denotes the condi-
tional expectation under Q given St = s, Xt = x.
Incorporating counterparty risk, we let τ = min{τ0, τ1, τ2}, which is the
first default time among the three parties with the intensity function




The corresponding three default events {τ = τ0}, {τ = τ1} and {τ = τ2} are
mutually exclusive. When the reference entity defaults ahead of parties 1 and
2, i.e. τ = τ0, the contract is terminated and party 1 receives l(τ0, Xτ0) from
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party 2 at time τ0. When either the market participant or the counterparty
defaults first, i.e. τ < τ0, the amount that the remaining party gets depends on
unwinding mechanism at the default time. We adopt the market convention
where the MtM value with counterparty risk provision, denoted by P , is used
to compute the value upon the participant’s defaults [see Fujii and Takahashi,
2013; Henry-Laborde`re, 2012].
Throughout, we use the notations x+ = x 1{x≥0} and x− = −x 1{x<0}.
Suppose that party 2 defaults first, i.e. τ = τ2. If the MtM value at default
is positive (Pτ2 ≥ 0), then party 1 incurs a loss only if the contract is under-
collateralized by party 2 (δ2 < 1) since the amount δ2 P
+
τ2
is secured as a
collateral. As a result, with the loss rate L2 (i.e. 1 - recovery rate) for party
2 , the total loss of party 1 at τ2 is L2 (1 − δ2)+P+τ2 . On the other hand,
suppose that the MtM value is negative (Pτ2 < 0). Party 1 has a loss only
if party 1 puts collateral more than the MtM value Pτ2 , i.e. the contract is
over-collateralized (δ1 ≥ 1). In this case, party 1’s total loss is the product of
the party 2’s loss rate and the exposure, i.e. L2 (δ1 − 1)+P−τ2 . Therefore, the
remaining value of the party 1’s position at the default time τ2 is
Pτ2 − L2 (1− δ2)+ P+τ2 − L2 (δ1 − 1)+ P−τ2 . (2.5)
Next, we consider the case when party 1 defaults first, i.e. τ = τ1. We
denote by L1 the loss rate of party 1. If the MtM value of party 1’s position
at the default is negative (Pτ1 < 0) and the contract is under-collateralized
(δ1 < 1), party 2’s loss is L1 (1 − δ1)+P−τ1 . Similarly, when the MtM value
is positive (Pτ1 ≥ 0) and the contract is over-collateralized (δ1 ≥ 1), party 2
incurs a loss of the amount L1 (δ2− 1)+P+τ1 . Because of the bilateral nature of
the contract, party 2’s loss is party 1’s gain. Therefore, at the default time τ1,
the value of party 1’s position is
Pτ1 + L1 (1− δ1)+ P−τ1 + L1 (δ2 − 1)+ P+τ1 . (2.6)
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Moreover, the market participant is exposed to funding cost associated
with collateralization over the period since the collateral rate and funding rate
do not coincide with the risk-free rate. When the liquidation value of the
contract Pt is positive to party 1 at time t, party 2 posts collateral δ2 P
+
t to
party 1. To keep the collateral, party 1 continuously pays collateral interest at
rate c2 to party 2 until any default time or expiry. On the other hand, when
Pt is negative to party 1, party 1 borrows δ1 P
−
t to post collateral to party
2. As a result, party 1 receives interest payments at rate c1 proportional to
collateral amount. We call ci the effective collateral rate of party i (i = 1, 2),
which is the nominal collateral rate minus the funding cost rate of party i. The
rates c1 and c2 can be both negative in practice if the funding costs are high.
Therefore, party 1 has the following cash flow generated by the collateral and





t − c2 δ2 P+t
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2.7)
The aforementioned cash flow analysis implies that the pre-default MtM
value with counterparty risk (CR) provision is given by









































The first and second line account for the terminal cash flow, the dividend,
and the payoff at the reference asset’s default (τ = τ0). The third fourth
line are the cash flows at party 2’s default (τ = τ2) in (2.5) and party 1’s
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default (τ = τ1) in (2.6), respectively. The last line results from the collateral
and effective collateral rates in (2.7). To simplify, we introduce the following
notations
r˜(t, s, x) = r(t, x) + λ(t, s, x) , (2.10)
α(t, s, x) = L2 λ
(2)(t, s, x) (1− δ2)+ − L1 λ(1)(t, s, x) (δ2 − 1)+ + c2 δ2 ,
(2.11)
β(t, s, x) = L1 λ
(1)(t, s, x) (1− δ1)+ − L2 λ(2)(t, s, x) (δ1 − 1)+ + c1 δ1 ,
(2.12)
f(t, s, x, y) = h(s, x) + λ(0)(t, s, x) l(t, x) + (λ(1) + λ(2) − β)(t, s, x)y
+ (β − α)(t, s, x) y+ . (2.13)
This allows to express (2.9) in the equivalent but simplified form:













where r˜t ≡ r˜(t, St, Xt) as defined in (2.10).
Remark 2.1. As an alternative of MtM value with CR provision, the liquidation
value at the time of default can be evaluated as the CRF value of the claim.
In other words, at the default time τ < τ0, the liquidation value is evaluated
as Πτ rather than Pτ . Replacing Pu in (2.14) with Πu for t ≤ u ≤ T gives the
MtM value without CR provision (see Henry-Laborde`re [2012]):













To conclude this section, we summarize the symbols and their financial
meanings in Table 2.1 which we will use frequently throughout this paper.
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Symbol Definition Symbol Definition for party i ∈ {1, 2}
P MtM value with CR provision Ri Recovery rate
P̂ MtM value without CR provision ci Effective collateral rate
Π CRF value δi Collateralization ratio
τ0 Default time of reference asset τi Default time
λ(0) Default intensity of reference asset λ(i) Default intensity
Table 2.1: Summary of notations
2.1.2 Bid-Ask Prices
In OTC trading, market participants, such as dealers, may take a long position
as a buyer or a short position as a seller. Without counterparty risk, the buyer’s
CRF bid price Πb(t, s, x) for a claim with payoff (g, h, l) is given by (2.4). The
MtM value of the seller’s position satisfies (2.4) by replacing (g, h, l) with
(−g,−h,−l), the negative of which gives the seller’s CRF ask price Πs(t, s, x).
In fact, the bid-ask prices are identical, i.e. Πb(t, s, x) = Πs(t, s, x).
Similarly for the case with counterparty risk provision, the buyer’s bid price
is P b(t, s, x) = P (t, s, x) as in (2.14). The seller’s ask price is given by
















f˜(t, s, x, y) = h(s, x) + λ(0)(t, s, x)l(t, x) + (λ(1) + λ(2) − β)(t, s, x)y
− (β − α)(t, s, x)y− . (2.17)
Since f˜(t, s, x, y) is different from f(t, s, x, y) in (2.13), the symmetry ob-
served in the CRF prices generally no longer holds in the presence of bilateral
counterparty risk. Most importantly, such an asymmetry generates bid-ask
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spreads for defaultable claims. For any contract with counterparty risk provi-
sion, the participant can quote two prices: P b(t, s, x) as a buyer or P s(t, s, x)
as a seller. In addition, since the payoff components (g, h, l) can be negative,
the bid and/or ask prices also can be negative (see Figure 2.4).
The bilateral credit valuation adjustment (BCVA) is defined as a deviation
of the MtM value from the CRF value, namely, Π−P b for a long position and
P s−Π for a short position. The bid-ask spread accounting for the BCVA with
CR provision is defined as S(t, s, x) = P s(t, s, x)− P b(t, s, x).
The two factors α and β in (2.11) and (2.12) that appear in f and f˜
summarize the effects of counterparty risk and collateralization on the bid-ask
prices. Specifically, α explains the effect of positive counterparty exposure
of the MtM value P+u while β explains the effect of negative exposure P
−
u .
When the two parameters have the same value (α = β), the two functions
f and f˜ in (2.13) and (2.17) are identical. Therefore, the bid-ask prices P b
and P s are equal. Such a price symmetry also arises in a number of other
scenarios: (i) when both parties have perfect collateralization ratio (δ1 = δ2 =
1) and the same effective collateral rate (c1 = c2); (ii) when both parties have
zero collateralization ratio (δ1 = δ2 = 0) with the same effective default rate
(L1 λ
(1) = L2 λ
(2)), and (iii) when both parties have the same effective collateral
rate (c1 = c2) with the same effective default rate and collateralization ratio
(L1 λ
(1) = L2 λ
(2), δ1 = δ2).
Remark 2.2. When the counterparty risk-free value Π is used to estimate the
liquidation value upon default, the seller’s bid price is given by













where f˜ is defined in (2.17). In contrast to (2.14), the price function on the
LHS does not appear on the RHS.
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2.2 Fixed Point Method
The defining equation (2.14) has a recursive form whereby the price function
P appears on both sides. Denote the spacial domain by D := R+ × R. For
any function w ∈ Cb([0, T ]×D,R), we define the operator M by










t r˜v dvf(u, Su, Xu, w(u, Su, Xu)) du
]
. (2.19)
Then, we recognize from (2.14) that the MtM value with counterparty risk pro-
vision satisfies P =MP . This motivates us to show that the operatorM has
a unique fixed point, and therefore, guarantees the existence and uniqueness
of the MtM value P .
We discuss our fixed point approach by first showing that the operator
M defined in (2.19) preserves boundedness and continuity. To this end, we
outline a number of conditions according to Heath and Schweizer [2000].
(C1) We define
Γ(t, s, x) =
 r(t, x) + λ(0)(t, s, x)
b(t, x)

Σ(t, s, x) =
 σ(t, s) s 0
ρ η(t, x)
√
1− ρ2 η(t, x)
 .
The coefficients Γ and Σ are locally Lipschitz-continuous in s and x,
uniformly in t. That is, for each compact subset F of D, there is a
constant KF <∞ such that for ψ ∈ {Γ,Σ},
|ψ(t, s1, x1)− ψ(t, s2, x2)| ≤ KF ||(s1, x1)− (s2, x2)||
∀t ∈ [0, T ], (s1, x1) , (s2, x2) ∈ F , where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm in
R2.
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(C2) For all (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ) × D, the solution (S,X) neither explodes nor







= 1 and Q
(
(Su, Xu) ∈ D ,∀u ∈ [t, T ]
)
= 1 .
(C3) The functions h and g are bounded and continuous, and r, l and λ(i),
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, are positive, continuous and bounded.
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Lemma 2.3. Given any function w ∈ Cb([0, T ] × D,R), it follows that v :=
Mw ∈ Cb([0, T ]×D,R).
Proof. The boundedness of v follows directly from that of w, h, g, r, and λ(i)
(see condition (C3)). To prove the continuity of v, we first observe that
(t, s, x) 7→ e−
∫ T





t r˜v dvf(u, Su, Xu, w(u, Su, Xu)) du
(2.20)
is continuous Q-a.s. Indeed, the continuity of (S,X) implies that the mapping
(t, s, x) 7→ g(ST , XT ) is continuous Q-a.s. Also, (t, s, x, u) 7→ r˜(u, Su, Xu) and
(t, s, x, u) 7→ f(u, Su, Xu, w(u, Su, Xu))
are uniformly continuous and bounded Q-a.s. on compact subsets of [0, T ]×D×
[t, T ]. Hence, the mapping in (2.20) is continuousQ-a.s. Taking expectation on
the RHS of (2.20) and applying Dominated Convergence Theorem to exchange
expectation and continuity limits, we conclude.
2.2.1 Contraction Mapping
Next, we show that the mapping M is a contraction. By the boundedness




{|λ(1)(t, s, x) + λ(2)(t, s, x)− β(t, s, x)|+ |β(t, s, x)− α(t, s, x)|} .
Proposition 2.4. The mapping M defined in (2.19) is a contraction on the
space Cb([0, T ]×D,R) with respect to the norm
‖w‖γ := sup
(t,s,x)∈[0,T ]×D
e−γ (T−t)|w(t, s, x)| , (2.21)
for L < γ < ∞. In particular, M has a unique fixed point w∗ ∈ Cb([0, T ] ×
D,R).
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Proof. From (2.13), we observe that |f(t, s, x, y1)− f(t, s, x, y2)| ≤ L |y1− y2|,
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×D. This implies f is Lipschitz-continuous in y, uniformly
over (t, s, x). By Lemma 2.3, the operatorM maps Cb([0, T ]×D,R) into itself.
For (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×D, w1, w2 ∈ Cb([0, T ]×D,R), and γ > 0, we have






t r˜v dv(f(u, Su, Xu, w1(u, Su, Xu)











e−γ(T−u)L|w1(u, Su, Xu)− w2(u, Su, Xu)|eγ(T−u) du
]
(iii)






‖w1 − w2‖γ .
We have used the facts that r˜v ≥ 0 and f is Lipschitz in y in inequalities (i)
and (ii) respectively, while (iii) is implied by the norm in (2.21). As a result,
for any γ > L ≥ 0, M is a contraction.
The norm ‖ · ‖γ is equivalent to the supremum norm ‖ · ‖∞ on the space
Cb([0, T ] × D,R). A similar norm is used in Becherer and Schweizer [2005]
and Leung and Sircar [2009] in their studies of reaction diffusion PDEs arising
from indifference pricing.
Using the fact that M is a contraction proved in Proposition 2.4, there
exists a sequence of functions (P (n))n≥0 that satisfy P (n+1) =MP (n), ∀n ≥ 0,
and the sequence converges to the fixed point P . The convergence does not
rely on the choice of the initial function. Indeed, one can simply pick any
bounded continuous function as a starting point, e.g. P (0) = 0 ∀(t, s, x), and
iterate to have a sequence (P (n))n≥0 that resides in Cb([0, T ]×D,R).
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Furthermore, we can show that for each n ≥ 1, P (n) ≡ P (n)(t, s, x) is a
classical solution of the following inhomogeneous PDE problem:
∂P (n)
∂t
+ LP (n) − r˜(t, s, x)P (n) + f(t, s, x, P (n−1)) = 0 ,
P (n)(T, s, x) = g(s, x) , (2.22)












+ ρ η(t, x)σ(t, s) s
∂2
∂s∂x







In order to prove the result, we need the following additional conditions,
adapted in our notation from (A3′)− (A3d′) of Heath and Schweizer [2000].
(C4) There exists a sequence (Dn)n∈N of bounded domains with closure D¯n ⊂
D such that ∪∞n=1Dn = D and each Dn has a C2-boundary.
As in Heath and Schweizer [2000], one can take Dn = [ 1n , n]×[−n, n] ⊂ R+×R.
For each n, we require that
(C5) b(t, x), a(t, s, x) := Σ(t, s, x) Σt(t, s, x), and r˜(t, s, x) be uniformly Lipschitz-
continuous on [0, T ]× D¯n, where Σt denotes the transpose matrix of Σ,
(C6) a(t, s, x) be uniformly elliptic on R2 for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T )×Dn, i.e. there
is δn > 0 such that y
t a(t, s, x) y ≥ δn‖y‖2 for all y ∈ R2,
(C7) f(t, s, x, y) be uniformly Ho¨lder-continuous on [0, T ]× D¯n × R.
The conditions (C1) – (C7) are quite general, and they allow for various mod-
els, including the Heston, CEV, and thus, geometric Brownian motion models
for equity, and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross models for the
stochastic factor X [Heath and Schweizer, 2000, Sect. 2]. The triplet (g, h, l),
default intensities λ(i) and interest rate r can be easily chosen to satisfy the
boundedness and continuity conditions in (C3), as we will do in our examples
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
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Theorem 2.5. Under conditions (C1) − (C7), there exists a sequence of
bounded classical solutions (P (n)) ⊂ C1,2b ([0, T ) × D,R) of the PDE problem
(2.22) that converges to the fixed point P ∈ Cb([0, T ) × D,R) of the operator
M.
We provide the proof in Appendix A.1. The insight of Proposition 2.4 and
Theorem 2.5 is that we can construct and solve a series of inhomogeneous
but linear PDEs whose classical solutions converge to a unique fixed point
price function P as in (2.14). Recent studies by Burgard and Kjaer [2011] and
Henry-Laborde`re [2012] evaluate the MtM value P (t, s, x) by working with the
associated nonlinear PDE of the form:
∂P
∂t
+ LP − r˜(t, s, x)P + f(t, s, x, P ) = 0 , (2.24)
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ) × D, with terminal condition P (T, s, x) = g(s, x), for
(s, x) ∈ D. The nonlinearity of (2.24) poses major challenges on analyzing
and numerically solving for P . Henry-Laborde`re [2012] provides a method to
approximate the solution that involves replacing the nonlinear term f with
a polynomial and simulating a marked branching diffusion. This method,
however, does not guarantee that the solution from simulation will resemble
the solution of the nonlinear PDE, and does not ensure any regularity, such as
continuity or boundedness of, either solution. Henry-Laborde`re [2012] provides
conditions on the chosen polynomial to avoid a “blow-up” of the simulation
algorithm. In contrast, our fixed point methodology circumvents this issue by
establishing that the pricing definition in (2.14) is a contraction mapping, as
opposed to working with the nonlinear PDE. As a result, we solve a series of
linear PDE problems with bounded classical solutions. In the limit, a unique
bounded continuous MtM value P is obtained.
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2.2.2 Numerical Implementation
Our contraction mapping methodology lends itself to a recursive numerical al-
gorithm. As mentioned in the previous section, we iteratively solve a sequence
of linear inhomogeneous PDEs (2.22). At each iteration, the error is mea-
sured in terms of the maximum difference between two consecutive solutions
P (n) and P (n−1) over the entire domain [0, T ]× D. We continue the iteration
procedure until the error is less than the pre-defined tolerance level ¯.
For implementation, we use the standard Crank-Nicolson finite difference
method (FDM) to obtain the values (see, among others, Wilmott et al. [1995]
and Strikwerda [2007]). We restrict the domain [0, T ] × D to a finite domain
D¯ = {(t, s, x) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T, X ≤ x ≤ X¯, 0 ≤ s ≤ S¯}. The parameters
S¯, X and X¯ are sufficiently large enough to preserve the accuracy of the
numerical solutions. We discretize the function P (n)(t, s, x) as P (n)(ti, sj, xk)
where i ∈ {0, ..., N}, j ∈ {0, ...,M} and k ∈ {0, ..., L} with ∆t = T/N ,
∆s = S¯/M , ∆x = (X¯ − X)/L and ti = i∆t, sj = j∆s, xk = k∆x. Our
numerical procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Fixed Point Algorithm for Evaluating the MtM Value P
set n = 1, P+ = P (0)
solve for P (1) from PDE (2.22)
set  = ‖P (1) − P (0)‖∞
while  > ¯ do
set n = n+ 1, P+ = P (n−1)
solve for P (n) from PDE (2.22)
set  = ‖P (n) − P (n−1)‖∞
end while
return P (n)
For the CRF value, we solve the linear PDE associated with Π ≡ Π(t, s, x)
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+ LΠ− r˜(t, s, x) Π(t, s, x) + h(s, x) + λ(0)(t, s, x) l(t, x) = 0 , (2.25)
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ) × D, with terminal condition Π(T, s, x) = g(s, x), for
(s, x) ∈ D. The CRF value becomes an input to the PDE problem for the
MtM value without provision, given by
∂P̂
∂t
+ LP̂ − r˜(t, s, x) P̂ + f(t, s, x,Π(t, s, x)) = 0 , (2.26)
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T ) × D, and P̂ (T, s, x) = g(s, x), for (s, x) ∈ D. Again, we
apply the Crank-Nicolson FDM method to compute their values.
2.3 Defaultable Equity Derivatives with Coun-
terparty Risk
We now apply our valuation methodology to value a number of defaultable
equity claims. Specifically, we will derive and compare the MtM values with
and without counterparty risk provisions as well as the CRF value. Moreover,
we will analyze and illustrate the bid-ask prices.





St dt+ σ St dWt , (2.27)
where we assume constant interest rate r and default rates λ(i), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.




α = L2 λ
(2)(1− δ2)+ − L1 λ(1)(δ2 − 1)+ + c2 δ2 , (2.28)
β = L1 λ
(1)(1− δ1)+ − L2 λ(2)(δ1 − 1)+ + c1 δ1 . (2.29)
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2.3.1 Call Spreads
Let us consider a generic call spread with the terminal payoff :
g(ST ) =

m2 if ST > K + 2 ,
(m1+m2)
1+2
(ST −K) if K − 1 ≤ ST ≤ K + 2 ,
−m1 if ST < K − 1 ,
(2.30)
with m1,m2, 1, 2 > 0, where m1/1 = m2/2 =: M . The payoff resembles
that of a long position of M call options with strike K− 1, a short position of
M call options with strike K + 2 and short m1 notional of zero coupon bond
with the same maturity. Similar positions can be achieved when two OTC
traders buy and sell call options with different strikes, plus/minus some cash.
As 1 and 2 in (2.30) go to zero, the payoff converges to that of a digital call
position covered in Henry-Laborde`re [2012].
With the terminal payoff g in (2.30), dividend h = 0, and value at reference




CBS(t, s ;T,K − 1, r + λ(0), σ)− CBS(t, s ;T,K + 2, r + λ(0), σ)
)
− e−r(T−t) m1 ,
where CBS(t, s ;T,K, r, σ) is the Black-Scholes call option price at time t with
spot price s, maturity T , strike price K, risk-free rate r and volatility σ. From
(2.14), the MtM value with counterparty risk provision is given by
P (t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+λ)(T−t) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(u−t) f(u, Su, Pu) du
]
, (2.31)
where f(t, s, y) := λ(0)l(t) + (λ(1) + λ(2) − β)y + (β − α)y+. The MtM value
without counterparty risk provision P̂ (t, s) is similarly obtained replacing Pu
in (2.31) with Πu.
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The model for S in (2.27), the triple (g, h, l), and other (constant) coeffi-
cients satisfy the conditions (C1)-(C7) with domain D = R+ (see also [Heath
and Schweizer, 2000, Sect.2]). We numerically compute the MtM value P (t, s)
by Algorithm 1 from Section 2.2.2. For the iterative PDE (2.22), we adopt
the coefficients in this section and the terminal payoff g(ST ) given in (2.30).
In Table 2.2, we show the convergence of the MtM values with provision for
three different contracts where 1 = 2 = {2, 1, 0.01}. The first column of each
contract shows the value of the MtM value of the contract at spot s = 10 for
each step 0 ≤ n ≤ 5. The second column of each contract shows the supremum
norm  = ‖P (n) − P (n−1)‖∞ for each step 0 ≤ n ≤ 5. The algorithm stops at
n = 5 for all three contracts.
1 = 2 = 2 1 = 2 = 1 1 = 2 = 0.01
P (n)(0, 10)  P (n)(0, 10)  P (n)(0, 10) 
n = 0 0 - 0 - 0 -
n = 1 -0.1197 0.9048 -0.1293 0.9048 -0.1326 0.9048
n = 2 -0.1387 0.0992 -0.1490 0.0992 -0.1526 0.0992
n = 3 -0.1377 0.0060 -0.1479 0.0060 -0.1515 0.0060
n = 4 -0.1377 0.0002 -0.1480 0.0002 -0.1516 0.0002
n = 5 -0.1377 < 10−5 -0.1480 < 10−5 -0.1516 < 10−5
Table 2.2: Convergence of the MtM values of a call spread
Convergence of the MtM values with provision P (0, s) of call spread contract at
spot price s = 10 (at-the-money) and m1 = m2 = 1. Parameters: K = 10, T = 2,
t = 0, r = 2%, σ = 25%, λ(0) = 3%, λ(1) = 5%, λ(2) = 15%, R1 = 40%, R2 = 40%,
δ1 = δ2 = 0, ¯ = 10
−5, S¯ = 40, ∆S = 0.01, ∆t = 1/1000.
Let us visualize the convergence of the MtM value with CR provision
P (n)(0, s) in Figure 2.1 (left). Using the tolerance level ¯ = 10−5 for the
maximum difference over each iteration, the algorithm stops after 4 iterations.
As we can see, the price functions P (3)(0, s) and P (4)(0, s) over 0 ≤ s ≤ S¯ = 40
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are not visibly distinguishable.















































Figure 2.1: The MtM values of a call spread
(Left) Convergence of the MtM values with provision of a call spread P (0, s)
for s ∈ [10, 18]. (Right) Comparison of the three MtM values of a call spread
{Π(0, s), P̂ (0, s), P (0, s)} over the spot price. Parameters are given in Table 2.2.
In Figure 2.1 (right), we plot three different values Π(0, s), P̂ (0, s) and
P (0, s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ S¯. As we can see, the ordering of these three values can
change completely depending on the spot price. For example, for large spot
prices, we observe that the CRF value dominates the other two MtM values,
but it is lowest when the spot price is small. Furthermore, the value without
provision dominates the value with provision for high spot prices, and the
opposite holds true for low spot prices.
Next, we look at the sensitivity of the MtM values with respect to the
counterparty’s or own default risk, collateralization ratio and effective collat-
eral rate. In Figure 2.2, the MtM values are decreasing in the counterparty
default rate (left) and increasing in the participant’s own default rate (right),
as is intuitive. Note that the MtM value with provision moves more rapidly
with respect to the counterparty default rate, but the MtM value without
provision is more sensitive in the participant’s own default rate.
In Figure 2.3 (left), an increase in δ2 reduces counterparty-risk exposure,
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and therefore, increases the MtM values with and without counterparty risk
provision. The rate of increase in contract value slows down when the collater-
alization ratio exceed 1. In the over-collateralized range [1, 1.2], party 1 is no
longer exposed to the counterparty’s default risk. The increase in the contact
value (from party 1’s perspective) results from the possibility of collecting the
excess collateral upon party 1’s own default.
In practice, if the participant’s funding cost rate is high, the effective col-
lateral rate can be negative (see Burgard and Kjaer [2011]). This implies a
net interest payment by the participant for the long position due to collater-
alization. As the effective collateral rate becomes more negative, the contract
values with and without provision decrease as we observe on the right panel
of Figure 2.3.















































Figure 2.2: The MtM values of a call spread in terms of λ(2) and λ(1)
(Left) The MtM values with and without provision are decreasing in the counter-
party default rate λ(2) with λ(1) = 15%. (Right) The MtM values are increasing in
λ(1) with λ(2) = 15%. The CRF value stays constant as λ(2) or λ(1) varies. Parame-
ters: 1 = 2 = 0.01, m1 = m2 = 1, s = 15, K = 10, T = 2, t = 0, r = 2%, σ = 25%,
λ(0) = 3%, R1 = R2 = 40%, δ1 = δ2 = 0%, c1 = c2 = 1%, ¯ = 10
−5, ∆S = 0.05,
∆t = 1/250.
We illustrate the bid-ask prices P b and P s of a call spread in Figure 2.4. On
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Figure 2.3: The MtM values of a call spread in terms of δ(2) and c1
(Left) The MtM values of a call spread with and without provision are decreasing in
counterparty’s collateralization ratio δ2. (Right) The MtM values of a call spread are
increasing in the participant’s effective collateral rate c1 ∈ [−5%, 0%]. Parameters:
1 = 2 = 0.01, m1 = m2 = 1, s = 15, K = 10, T = 2, t = 0, r = 2%, σ = 25%,
λ(0) = 3%, λ(1) = 5%, λ(2) = 15%, R1 = R2 = 40%, δ1 ∈ {0% (left), 100% (right)},
δ2 = 100%, c1 = c2 = 1%, ¯ = 10
−5, ∆S = 0.05, ∆t = 1/250.
the left panel where the participant is assumed to be default-free, we observe
the dominance of the three prices: P s ≥ Π ≥ P b. However, in the bilateral
counterparty-risk case, the ordering of prices is different in in-the-money (ITM)
and out-of-money (OTM) ranges. We see that Π ≥ P s ≥ P b in the ITM range,
but P s ≥ P b ≥ Π in the OTM range.
2.3.2 Equity Forwards
Equity forward contracts are commonly traded in the OTC market. With
stock S as the underlying asset, we consider a forward with maturity T . The
initial forward price F0 is set so that the contract has zero value at inception.
When the underlying stock defaults, the stock price goes to zero, and the buyer
has to pay the discounted value e−r (T−τ0)F0 at the default time. The contract
cash flow is described by the triplet (g, h, l) = (ST − F0, 0,−e−r (T−τ0)F0). As
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Figure 2.4: The bid ask prices of a call spread with counterparty risk provision
Call spread bid and ask prices with counterparty risk provision under (left) unilateral
counterparty risk λ(1) = 0%, λ(2) = 15%, and (right) bilateral counterparty risk
λ(1) = 5% , λ(2) = 15%. Other parameters are the same as in Figure 2.2.
the underlying stock price fluctuates over time, the MtM value also varies.
The MtM value of a long forward contract P (t, s) with provision (see (2.31))
is computed using Algorithm 1. In Table 2.3, we show the convergence result
of the MtM value at time t = 1 when the stock price S1 = 20, with initial
forward price F0 = 10. The first column of each case shows the value of the
forward contract for each step n ∈ {1, ..., 6}. The second column of each case
shows the error in terms of the supremum norm ‖P (n) − P (n−1)‖∞ over the
whole domain [0, T ] × D, and with tolerance ¯ = 10−5 the algorithm stops at
n = 6 in both cases. The number of iterations may depend on the initial value
P (0), threshold ¯ and upper bound S¯. As we observe, for sufficiently large
upper bounds S¯ ∈ {30, 40}, the convergent prices are the same.
At time t, when the stock price is s, the CRF value of a long forward is
given by
Π(t, s) = (s− e−r (T−t)F0) . (2.32)
In order to compute the MtM value of a long forward contract P̂ b without
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S1 = 20 S¯ = 30 S¯ = 40
Value  Value 
n = 0 0 - 0 -
n = 1 8.6900 17.5592 8.6900 26.4284
n = 2 7.6124 2.1391 7.6124 3.2034
n = 3 7.6777 0.1289 7.6777 0.1927
n = 4 7.6751 0.0052 7.6751 0.0077
n = 5 7.6752 0.0002 7.6752 0.0002
n = 6 7.6752 < 10−5 7.6752 < 10−5
Table 2.3: Convergence of the MtM values of a forward
Convergence of the values of a forward contract when spot price S1 = 20 at t = 1,
with maximum stock price S¯ ∈ {30 (left column),40 (right column)}. Other common
parameters: F0 = 10, T = 3, r = 2%, σ = 25%, λ
(0) = 3%, λ(1) = 5%, λ(2) = 15%,
R1 = 40%, R2 = 40%, δ1 = δ2 = 0, ¯ = 10
−5, ∆S = 0.05, ∆t = 1/500.
counterparty risk provision, we apply (2.32) to (2.15) and obtain





(β − α) Π+(u, Su)
)− β Π(u, Su) du]





(β − α)(Su − e−r(T−u)F0)+
















To simplify the above equation, we notice that
Et,s
[
e−r (u−t)(Su − e−r(T−u)F0)+
]
= CBS(t, s ;T, e−r(T−u)F0, r + λ(0), σ) .
We apply similar arguments to the seller’s MtM value, and summarize as
follows.
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Proposition 2.6. The bid-ask prices without counterparty risk provision, P̂ b(t, s)
and P̂ s(t, s), of a stock forward without counterparty risk provision are given
by


















with Π(t, s) satisfying (2.32).
The fair forward price makes the MtM value of the contract equal to zero
at the start of the contract. The CRF value in (2.32) implies that F0 =
er TS0. However, the fair forward price in presence of bilateral counterparty
risk is found implicitly. Precisely, the fair forward price F ∗0 of a long (resp.
short) position makes the MtM value with counterparty risk provision satisfies
P b(0, S0;F
b
0 ) = 0 (resp. P
s(0, S0;F
s
0 ) = 0).
In Figure 2.5, we plot the bid-ask prices P b and P s of the forward contract
with counterparty risk provision together with the CRF value. On the left
panel, all three values increase as the underlying stock price increases. Similar
to the call spread case, the price ordering changes from Π ≥ P s ≥ P b in the
ITM range to P s ≥ P b ≥ Π in the OTM range. On the right panel, both
MtM values decrease significantly as the counterparty default rate increases.
However, the MtM with provision moves more rapidly, similar to Figure 2.2.
Remark 2.7 (Total Return Swap). Total return swaps (TRS) are also traded
over the counter as an alternative to equity stock forwards. The swap buyer
will receive the increase in equity value at swap expiration date T , ST − S0.
On the other hand, the buyer continuously pays a premium rate p ≥ r until
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Figure 2.5: The MtM value of a stock forward in terms of spot price and λ(2)
(Left) The value of a stock forward at time 0 is increasing in the spot price. The
fair forward price is the spot price at which the contract value is zero. (Right) The
MtM forward contract values of a stock forward are decreasing in the counterparty’s
default rate λ(2), with F0 = 10, t = 1 and T = 3. Parameters: r = 2%, σ = 25%,
λ(0) = 3%, λ(1) = 5%, R1 = 40%, λ
(2) = 15%, R2 = 40%, δ1 = δ2 = 0, ¯ = 10
−5,
∆S = 0.05, ∆t = 1/500.
the expiration date and also pays the decrease in the equity value at the
expiration date to the swap seller. The TRS is represented as the triplet
(ST − S0,−p,−S0 e−r (T−τ0)).
2.3.3 Claims with Positive Payoffs
Some derivatives have positive payoffs, i.e. the triplet g, h, l ≥ 0, including
calls, puts and digital options. For both conventions, the nonlinear property
of the price function disappears since we can substitute the nonlinear functions
P+(t, s) and Π+(t, s) in (2.24) and (2.26) by the linear functions P (t, s) and
Π(t, s). From this observation, we derive the formulae for the bid-ask prices
of derivatives with positive payoffs.
Proposition 2.8. For any claim with g, h, l ≥ 0, the bid-ask prices of with
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counterparty risk provision satisfy
P b(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+α+λ








P s(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+β+λ








Without counterparty risk provision (see Remark 2.1), the bid-ask prices satisfy
P̂ b(t, s) = Π(t, s)− Et,s
[∫ T
t
α e−(r+λ) (u−t) Π(u, Su) du
]
, (2.35)
P̂ s(t, s) = Π(t, s)− Et,s
[∫ T
t
β e−(r+λ) (u−t) Π(u, Su) du
]
. (2.36)
We apply these results to call options on a defaultable stock.
Example 2.9. The bid price of a European call option with provision is given
by
P b(t, s) = e−α(T−t) CBS(t, s ;T,K, r + λ(0), σ) . (2.37)
Moreover, the bid price of a European call option without provision is given
by







CBS(t, s ;T,K, r + λ(0), σ) .
(2.38)
In both (2.37) and (2.38), the bid prices have two components: the CRF
value of the call option, i.e. Black-Scholes price, and a multiplier that depends
on the parameter α (see (2.28)). First, suppose that α = 0. This happens, for
example, when the contract is perfectly collateralized and effective collateral
rate is zero, i.e. δ2 = c2 = 0. In this case, both bid prices are identical
to the CRF value Π(t, s) = CBS(t, s ;T,K, r + λ(0), σ). The parameter α is
positive when the contract is under-collateralized by party 2, i.e. δ2 < 1. In
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this case, the call option buyer is exposed to counterparty default risk, and
consequently, the bid prices are less than the CRF value Π(t, s). On the other
hand, α becomes negative when the contract is over-collateralized by party 2
and the collateral rate is negligible, i.e. δ2 > 1 and c2 = 0. The call buyer
receives additional financial benefit from excess collateral since the buyer only
returns a fraction 1− L1 of the over-collateralized amount at the buyer’s own
default. As a result, the bid prices are greater than the CRF value.








































Figure 2.6: The bid prices of a call option
The bid prices of a call option with and without counterparty risk provision are
increasing in stock price s ∈ [5, 15] (left) and in maturity T ∈ [0, 5] (right). Param-
eters: λ(0) = 5%, λ(2) = 10%, S0 = 10, T = 1, t = 0, r = 2%, σ = 25%, R1 = R2 =
40%, K = S0 = 10 and δ1 = δ2 = 0.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the two bid prices (with and without provision) for
various maturities and spot prices. We observe the dominance of the price
without provision over the price with provision. Moreover, the difference of
two prices increase as maturity or spot price increases. This wider level of
difference is attributed to the fact that the difference of counterparty risk
exposure increases as the maturity increases.
Next, we derive a number of price dominance relationships for the bid-ask
prices and the CRF value of claims with positive payoffs.
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Proposition 2.10. Consider any claim with the triplet g, h, l ≥ 0. If α, β ≥ 0,
then the following price dominance relationships hold:
P̂ b(t, s), P̂ s(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s) and P b(t, s), P s(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s) . (2.39)
Furthermore, if λ(1) + λ(2) ≥ α, β ≥ 0, then we have
P b(t, s) ≤ P̂ b(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s) and P s(t, s) ≤ P̂ s(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s) . (2.40)
We provide a proof in Appendix A.3. In market conditions where the effec-
tive collateral rates c1, c2 are much lower than the counterparty/own default
rates λ(1), λ(2), the conditions for (2.39) and (2.40) are satisfied. In turn, since
the buyer’s (resp. seller’s) MtM value with provision assumes P b (resp. P s)
as the liquidation value, which is lower than the liquidation value Π in the
case without provision according to (2.39), this implies the price dominance
relationships in (2.40), as is presented in Figure 2.6.
2.4 Defaultable Fixed-Income Derivatives with
Counterparty Risk
We now consider defaultable fixed-income claims under bilateral counterparty
risk setting. As a special case, we assume that the risk free rate is a time-
deterministic function r(t), and the default intensities λ(i), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, are
of the form λ(i)(t,Xt) = ψi(t) + wiXt. We model the stochastic factor X by
two affine diffusions: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR)
processes. Under the OU model, the factor process X follows
dXt = κ(θ −Xt) dt+ σ dW˜t ,
with positive constant parameters κ, θ, σ > 0 that represent the speed of mean
reversion, long-term mean, and volatility, respectively. In the CIR model, the
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factor process X follows
dXt = κ(θ −Xt) dt+ σ
√
Xt dW˜t ,
where the positive parameters {κ, θ, σ} satisfy κ , θ , σ > 0 and the Feller
condition 2κ θ > σ2 so that X stays positive at all times a.s. Both mod-
els for X satisfy the corresponding conditions among (C1)-(C7) [Heath and
Schweizer, 2000, Sections 2.1-2.2], and we will consider here swaps whose payoff
are bounded continuous.
A generic fixed-income contract is described by the triplet (g(x), h(x), l(t, x)),
with default times {τi}i=0,1,2 as in (2.1). From (2.14), the MtM value with
counterparty risk provision is given by













where f(t, x, y) = h(x) + λ(0)(t, x) l(t, x) + (λ(1)(t, x) + λ(2)(t, x)− β(t, x))y +
(β(t, x)− α(t, x)) y+. The parameters α(t, x) and β(t, x) are defined similarly
to the definitions (2.11) and (2.12). The MtM value without counterparty risk
provision P̂ (t, x) is similarly obtained by replacing P (u,Xu) with Π(u,Xu) in
the right hand side of (2.41). Noticing that P (t, x) in (2.41) is a special case
of P (t, s, x) in (2.14), we use Algorithm 1 to find the MtM value by solving
iteratively the following PDE:
∂P (n)
∂t
+ LXP (n) − (r(t) + λ(t, x))P (n) + f(t, x, P (n−1)) = 0 , (2.42)
for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R, with P (n)(T, x) = g(x) for x ∈ R (x ∈ R+ for the CIR
case).
The computation of the MtM values involves zero-coupon bond prices. In
the OU model, the pre-default zero-coupon bond price with maturity T and
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zero recovery meets the formula [Scho¨nbucher, 2003, Chap. 7.1.1]
C1(t, x ; T ) = e
















2 − κ θ B1(v)
)
dv , B1(u) =
1− eκu
κ
, 0 ≤ u ≤ T.
In the CIR model, the bond price is given by [Scho¨nbucher, 2003, Chap. 7.2]
C2(t, x ; T ) = e





















2 (eΞ·u − 1)w0




for 0 ≤ u ≤ T with constant Ξ = √κ2 + 2σ2w0 .
2.4.1 Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
After the 2008 financial crisis, CDS contracts are traded in a new standardized
way whereby the protection buyer pays at a fixed premium rate, along with
a non-zero (positive/negative) upfront payment at the start of the contract.
A long position of a CDS contract written on the default event {τ0 ≤ T} is
summarized by the triplet notation (0,−p, 1). Under the OU model, the buyer
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Under the CIR model, the pre-default upfront price of a CDS with maturity






w0(κ θ B2(u− t) +B′2(u− t)x)− p
]
du , (2.47)
with C2(t, x ; u) in (2.44) and B2(·) in (2.45). See Chap. 7 of Scho¨nbucher
[2003].
For numerical examples, we assume the constant interest rate r and con-
stant default rates λ(1) and λ(2). The reference default intensity is modeled
by λ
(0)
t = Xt, i.e. ψ0 = 0 and w0 = 1. For implementation, we apply the
FDM and Algorithm 1 in Section 2.2.2 to (2.42) to obtain the MtM value with
counterparty risk provision. In Table 2.4, we show the convergence of the CDS
MtM values. The first and second columns for each model show the values of
the CDS at x = 2% and x = 8%, respectively. In addition, the third column
shows the error in terms of the supremum norm  = ‖P (n)−P (n−1)‖∞ over the
entire grid for each step n = 1, 2, . . . , 7. The algorithm stops at n = 5 under
the OU model, and at n = 7 under the CIR model with the common tolerance
level ¯ = 10−5.
In Figure 2.7, we compare the three MtM values in terms of the counter-
party recovery rate R2 = 1 − L2 and the counterparty default rate λ(2). The
CRF value is given by (2.47) and is independent of R2 and λ
(2). An increase in
counterparty recovery rate or a decrease in counterparty default rate improves
both MtM values, whereas the CRF value does not change. In both cases, the
MtM value without provision dominates the MtM value with provision.
2.4.2 Total Return Swaps (TRS)
Total return swaps (TRS) on defaultable bonds are OTC traded, and their
MtM values are subject to counterparty risk. A TRS is also referred to as a
bond forward [see Scho¨nbucher, 2003, Chap. 2.5]. Fix a maturity of T years,
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OU CIR
P (n)(0, 2%) P (n)(0, 10%)  P (n)(0, 2%) P (n)(0, 10%) 
n = 0 0 0 - 0 -
n = 1 -0.1326 0.05218 0.9048 -0.1130 0.1569 0.3950
n = 2 -0.1526 0.04518 0.0992 -0.1131 0.1176 0.0911
n = 3 -0.1515 0.04562 0.0060 -0.1130 0.1248 0.0159
n = 4 -0.1516 0.04560 0.0002 -0.1130 0.1238 0.0022
n = 5 -0.1516 0.04560 < 10−5 -0.1130 0.1239 0.0003
n = 6 - - - -0.1130 0.1239 < 10−4
n = 7 - - - -0.1130 0.1239 < 10−5
Table 2.4: Convergence of the MtM values of a CDS
Covergence of MtM values of a CDS in the OU/CIR model with reference default
rate x = 2% and x = 10%. For the OU model: θ = 3%, σ = 3.5%, κ = 5%. For the
CIR model: θ = 3%, σ = 5%, κ = 5%. Other common Parameters: T = 5, t = 0,
p = 100bps, r = 2%, ψ0 = 0, ψ1 = 5%, ψ2 = 25%, w0 = 1, w1 = w2 = 0, λ
(1) = 5%,
λ(2) = 25%, R1 = R2 = 40%, δ1 = δ2 = 0, ¯ = 10
−5, ∆X = 0.001, ∆t = 1/500.
we consider a TRS on a zero-recovery defaultable bond with maturity T ′ ≥ T .
The value of the defaultable bond, denoted by C, is given in (2.43) for the
OU model and in (2.44) for the CIR model. Given no default up to the swap
maturity T , the swap buyer receives the difference between the bond price
C(T,XT ; T
′) and the pre-specified strike K = C(0, X0;T ′) from the swap
seller. If the bond defaults before time T , the swap buyer pays the strike K
to the seller. Until the first default time τ or expiration date T , the buyer
continues to pay at the risk-free rate plus a spread r(t) + p. The CRF upfront
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Figure 2.7: The CDS upfront prices under the CIR model
The CDS upfront prices under the CIR Model are increasing in the counterparty
recovery rate R2 (left) and decreasing in the counterparty default rate λ
(2) (right).
Other parameters are same as in Table 2.4 along with x = 8%.
value of the TRS at time t ≤ T , is given by


















(0)(v,Xv)) dvK (r(u) + p) du
]








For the MtM upfront value P (t, x) with counterparty risk provision, we follow
(2.41) with the triplet
g(x) = C(T, x ; T ′)−K, h(t, x) = −K(r(t) + p), l(t, x) = −K.
In Figure 2.8, we obtain the bid-ask upfront prices with provision for a
CDS and a TRS, along with the counterparty risk-free upfront values, under
the CIR model. Since both CDS and TRS are swaps, the MtM values can be
positive or negative, depending on the reference default intensity. As buying a
CDS is similar to longing default risk, the CDS upfront value is increasing in
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Figure 2.8: The CDS and TRS bid-aks upfront prices under the CIR model
(Left) CDS bid-ask upfront prices under the CIR model. (Right) TRS bid-ask
upfront prices under the CIR model. Other common parameters: x = 8%, T = 3,
T ′ = 10, t = 0, p = 100bps, r = 2%, θ = 3%, κ = 5%, ψ0 = 0, ψ1 = 5%, ψ2 = 25%,
w0 = 1, w1 = w2 = 0, λ
(1) = 5%, R1 = 40%, λ
(2) = 25%, R2 = 40%, δ1 = δ2 = 0,
¯ = 10−8, ∆X = 0.001, ∆t = 1/500.
the reference default intensity (left). On the other hand, since the TRS buyer
is shorting default risk, the TRS upfront value decreases as the reference asset’s
default intensity λ(0) increases (right).
2.5 Conclusion
In summary, we have discussed a valuation framework to analytically study and
numerically compute financial contracts subject to reference and counterparty
default risks with bilateral collateralization. In addition to the underlying price
dynamics used in this chapter, our fixed point approach and the corresponding
iterative numerical algorithm can potentially be adapted to price derivatives
with counterparty risk in other models. The challenge lies in efficiently and
accurately solving a sequence of inhomogeneous PDE problems. Our model
also sheds light on the role played by counterparty risk and collateralization
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in the formation of bid-ask spreads.
Several interesting and practically important problems remain for future
investigation. For example, what are the price and risk impacts of utilizing
multiple counterparties for OTC trading? A recent study by Bo and Capponi
[2013] derives the BCVA of a CDS portfolio with a large number of entities.
Apart from pricing, counterparty risk should also be incorporated into static
or dynamic trading strategies for credit derivatives (see e.g. Jiao and Pham
[2011]; Leung and Liu [2012]; Leung [2012]).
Recently, a new contractual feature, termed the early termination clause,
has been introduced to a number of credit derivatives to mitigate the impact
of counterparty default risk. Giada and Nordio [2012] study the valuation of
an early termination option for swaps in presence of bilateral counterparty
risk. Also, Leung and Yamazaki [2013] and Egami et al. [2013] incorporate
the timing option to increase or reduce the position in the valuation of CDS.
We can also apply our counterparty risk pricing framework and methodologies
to these studies and analyze the potential impacts of bilteral counterparty risk
on the optimal timing. In view of the financial crisis, counterparty risk has
also become a key component in the design of clearing houses. Answers to
these questions will be useful not only for individual or institutional investors,
but also for regulators.
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Chapter 3
Trading of Defaultable Claims
under Risk Aversion and Belief
Heterogeneity
In this chapter, we study the problem of pricing and trading of defaultable
claims among investors with heterogeneous risk preferences and market views.
First, based on the utility-indifference pricing methodology, we construct the
bid-ask spreads for risk-averse buyers and sellers as a function of trading vol-
ume. In addition, we show that the spreads are nonlinear functions with re-
spect to trading volume and widen as risk aversion or trading volume increases.
Moreover, we analyze the optimal trading of defaultable claims for risk-averse
buyers and sellers under various market settings, including (i) when the mar-
ket pricing rule is linear, and (ii) when the counterparty – single or multiple
sellers – may have different nonlinear bid-ask prices generated by risk aversion
and belief heterogeneity. For applications, we provide explicit formulas for
the optimal trading positions of defaultable bonds and CDS, respectively, and
examine the properties and sensitivities of the optimal positions with respect
to risk aversions and beliefs. In particular, we find that belief heterogeneity,
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rather than the difference in risk aversion, is crucial to trigger a trade.
In Section 3.1, we formulate the optimal static trading problem for de-
faultable claims based on linear and nonlinear pricing rules. In Section 3.2, we
establish the investors’ utility-indifference pricing rules for defaultable bonds,
and derive the optimal positions under different market settings. In Section
3.3, we analyze the pricing and trading of CDS. Section 3.4 concludes this
chapter.
3.1 Problem Overview
When an investor considers buying defaultable claims from a single or multi-
ple sellers, he/she has to determine how many units to trade from each seller,
given their offered prices. Intuitively, the investor should take a long (resp.
short) position from a seller if the offered price is lower (resp. higher) than the
investor’s reservation price. If both the investor and sellers adopt the classi-
cal risk-neutral pricing rules, which are linear in quantity, then the resulting
trading position will be either zero or infinity. This motivates us to study the
trading problem when the investor’s reservation price is nonlinear in quantity
while the seller(s) may have a linear or nonlinear pricing rules. Our objective
is to (i) investigate the critical factors that trigger a trade between the investor
and the sellers, (ii) determine the optimal trading positions, and (iii) examine
the impact of risk aversion and other market parameters on trade sizes.
Given any contingent claim, the buyer’s pricing rule is defined by the map-
ping p : R+ 7→ R where p(c) represents the maximum amount of cash the
buyer is willing to pay for c ≥ 0 units of the claim. Similarly, the seller’s
pricing rule is defined by the mapping p˜ : R+ 7→ R where p˜(c) is the mini-
mum amount of cash the seller requires for selling c ≥ 0 units of the claim.
In other words, a buyer takes a long position in the claim with a pricing rule
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p(c) and a seller takes a short position with a pricing rule p˜(c). In the case of
zero-coupon defaultable bonds, to be discussed in Section 3.2, the buyer’s and
seller’s prices should both be positive since the bonds have non-negative ter-
minal payoffs. Nevertheless, the trading of CDS involves more complex pricing
rules characterized by both upfront fee and premium rate. We will discuss the
CDS problem in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 Optimal Trading with Linear Prices
Let us begin with the optimal static trading problem when the bid-ask prices
of a defaultable claim are linear with respect to quantity. The investor contem-
plates a long or short position in the claim at per-unit bid-ask prices ($pi, $p¯i)
offered by the sellers. At the moment, it is not necessary to specify a model
that generates the market bid-ask prices (pi, p¯i) as long as they do not lead
to arbitrage opportunities. For instance, we can simply assume that pi ≤ p¯i
and that they fall within the no-arbitrage price interval. The investor has
no influence over the market bid-ask prices, so (pi, p¯i) are independent of the
investor’s risk aversion and market belief. This setting is most relevant to mar-
kets with high liquidity where bid-ask prices are quoted per-unit regardless of
transaction quantity.
Given the ask price p¯i, the investor pays c p¯i to the sellers for a long position
of c units of the claim. Since the investor is willing to pay at most p(c) for
the position, the benefit from the trade is Bb := p(c)− c p¯i, which is the price
difference from a buyer’s perspective. The investor selects the optimal long
position c∗(p¯i) that maximizes the benefit, namely,
c∗(p¯i) = arg max
c≥0
p(c)− cp¯i . (3.1)
From (3.1), we observe that the optimal position is found from the Fenchel-
Legendre transform of p(c) as a function of c evaluated at p¯i. By similar
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arguments, if the investor decides to sell c units of the claim, the benefit from
the trade is Bs := cpi − p˜(c) given the bid price pi. The optimal short position
c˜∗(pi) is determined by
c˜∗(pi) = arg max
c≥0
cpi − p˜(c) .
We note that the buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions directly depend on the
market bid-ask prices (pi, p¯i).
3.1.2 Optimal Trading with Heterogenous Sellers
In a different setting, we consider the trading of a defaultable claim between
a risk-averse investor and a single or multiple risk-averse sellers. The investor
and the sellers may have different indifference pricing rules, reflecting their
differences in risk preferences and market beliefs.
First, let us discuss the case with a single seller. If the investor is consid-
ering to buy a defaultable claim, then the seller’s ask prices represent the cost
of acquiring the claim. The resulting trading benefit to the investor (buyer) is
the difference Bb := p(c)− p˜(c), and the optimal long position is given by
c∗b = arg max
c≥0
p(c)− p˜(c) .
On the other hand, if the investor decides to sell certain units of the claim and
receive the seller’s bid prices, then the trading benefit is Bs := p(c)− p˜(c) and
the optimal short position is
c∗s = arg max
c≥0
p(c)− p˜(c) .
As a result, the investor’s optimal trading position maximizes the spread be-
tween his/her pricing rule and the pricing rule offered by the seller.
Next, we proceed to a market with N heterogeneous sellers. Suppose the
investor is a potential buyer of the claim, and each seller i has a pricing rule
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pi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} =: N . The buyer’s static position is described by the
vector ~c = (c1, . . . , cN), where each ci represents the number of units of the
claim purchased from seller i, and the total holding is c¯ =
∑N
i=1 ci. The buyer
determines the optimal position c∗ by maximizing the trading benefit:






In particular, if the trading benefit Bb(~c) = p(c¯)−
∑N
i=1 p˜i(ci) is strictly concave
in ~c ∈ RN+ , then it has a unique maximizer. Note that it is possible to have
c∗i = 0 for one or more i ∈ N , which means the buyer does not purchase from
these sellers.
If the buyer seeks to buy a pre-specified α > 0 units of the claim from N
sellers, then an additional constraint,
∑N
i=1 ci = α, is imposed on the buyer’s
optimization problem:













Therefore, this amounts to minimizing the total cost of the claim from all
sellers. In particular, if all sellers’ prices are linear, then the investor will
always purchase all α units from the seller with the lowest per-unit price.
Henceforth, we will focus on sellers with nonlinear pricing rules.
3.2 Utility-Indifference Pricing and Optimal
Trading of Defaultable Bonds
We now discuss the trading problems described in Section 3.1 for defaultable
bonds. To this end, we apply the utility-indifference pricing methodology
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to establish the investor’s and sellers’ pricing rules. Our goal is to provide
explicit formulas and sensitivity analysis for the optimal trading positions
under various settings.
The defaultable bond pays $1 on the expiration date T if there is no default.
Throughout, we shall work with discounted cash flows. If the underlying asset
defaults at time τ before T , then the bond holder receives the discounted
recovery value $Re−rT with constant recovery rate R ∈ [0, 1). The investor can
dynamically trade the defaultable underlying, and a correlated non-defaultable
asset, along with the money market account with a constant interest rate r ≥ 0.
The discounted values of the non-defaultable asset price S(1) and defaultable
underlying S(2) evolve according to
dS
(i)
t = µi S
(i)




t , i = 1, 2,
where the expected excess return and the volatility vectors are defined by µ =
(µ1, µ2) ∈ R2 and σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ R2+. The Brownian motions (W (1),W (2)) are
defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,Q), and are correlated with correlation
parameter ρ ∈ (−1, 1). In addition, the default time of stock S(2) is modeled
by τ ∼ exp(λ), an exponential random variable with rate parameter λ > 0.
We assume that τ is independent of (W (1),W (2)).
With initial capital X0 at time 0, the discounted trading wealth at t ∈






t (µi dt+ σi dW
(i)
t ) , (3.3)




t ) represents the discounted cash amounts invested in S
(1)
and S(2) respectively. A trading strategy is deemed admissible if it is self-




∞. We denote by Θs,t the set of admissible strategies θ over the horizon [s, t].
We model the investor’s risk preferences by the exponential utility func-
tion U(x) = −e−γx, with constant risk aversion coefficient γ > 0. If the
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investor trades only the non-defaultable asset S(1) and the money market ac-










Here, θ(1) is the discounted cash amount invested in S(1), and we denote by
Θ̂s,t the set of admissible strategies in S
(1) over the horizon [s, t]. In order to
maximize the expected utility from dynamically trading, the investor solves
the well-known Merton [see Merton, 1969] portfolio optimization problem:




U(X̂T ) | X̂t = x
}
(3.4)






and the optimal trading strategy is given by θ̂∗s =
η1
γ
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T .
3.2.1 Bid-Ask Prices
We use utility indifference pricing approach to derive the pricing rules of the
risk-averse investor. We consider the utility maximization problem of the
investor holding the defaultable bond in addition to a dynamic portfolio. As
soon as S(2) defaults, the investor can only trade S(1) thereafter. After default,
the investor faces the Merton’s portfolio optimization problem solved in (3.5).
With c ∈ R units of the defaultable bond, the investor’s discounted trading
wealth (Xt)0≤t≤τ∧T follows (3.3) prior to default, and he/she solves the utility
maximization problem:






XT + c e
−r T ) 1{τ>T} +M (τ,Xτ + cR e−r T ) 1{τ≤T} |Xt = x} .
(3.7)
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In particular, if the investor holds no claim (c = 0), then the value function
V (t, x; γ, 0) is the maximal expected utility from dynamically investing in the
stocks without the defaultable bond.
Before stating the result, we define





















where η1 is defined in (3.6). We observe that η
2 ≥ η21 for ρ ∈ (−1, 1) since
η2 − η21 =
(ρ µ1 σ2 − µ2 σ1)2
(1− ρ2)σ21 σ22
≥ 0.
This implies that α >
η21
2
for λ > 0, and B(t) is well-defined.
Proposition 3.1. The value function V (t, x; γ, c) is given by
V (t, x; γ, c) = −e−γ (x+c e−r T ) w(t; γ, c) , (3.10)
where
w(t; γ, c) = A(t) + eγ c (1−R) e
−r T
B(t) , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.11)




, t ≤ u < τ ∧ T . (3.12)
Proof. We first write down the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE associ-
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= 0 . (3.14)







w(t) + λeγ c (1−R)e
−rT− 1
2
η21(T−t) = 0 , (3.15)
with w(T ) = 1. The explicit solution is given by (3.11). Finally, applying
(3.10) to the optimal θ∗ in (3.13), we get θ∗(t, x) = (Σ−1 µ)/γ , for (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× R.
Definition 3.2. At time t, the indifference bid (resp. ask) price for buying
(resp. selling) c ≥ 0 units of the defaultable claim is defined by the discounted
cash amount p(t; γ, c) (resp. p˜(t; γ, c)) that satisfies the equations
V (t, x; γ, 0) = V (t, x− p(t; γ, c); γ, c) , (3.16)
V (t, x ; γ, 0) = V (t, x+ p˜(t; γ, c); γ,−c) . (3.17)
The buyer’s indifference bid price p can also be interpreted as the highest
price that the buyer is willing to pay for a long position in c units of the
defaultable bond. Similarly, the seller’s indifference ask price p˜ is the lowest
price that the seller is willing to receive for a short position in c units of the
defaultable bond. Applying (3.10) to (3.16) and (3.17) leads to the formulas:











For notational convenience, we write the indifference prices and other quanti-
ties at time 0 as
p(γ, c) ≡ p(0; γ, c), p˜(γ, c) ≡ p˜(0; γ, c), w(γ, c) ≡ w(0; γ, c),
A = A(0) and B = B(0). (3.19)
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Next, we study several properties of the indifference prices, especially their
dependence on risk aversion γ and volume c.
Proposition 3.3. The buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices have the follow-
ing properties:
(i) Monotonicity and concavity/convexity in trading volume c: for c ≥ 0,
p(γ, c) is increasing strictly concave in c and p˜(γ, c) is increasing strictly
convex in c.
(ii) Monotonicity in risk aversion γ: p(γ, c) is decreasing in γ and p˜(γ, c) is
increasing in γ.



















where the zero risk-aversion (unit) prices p∗ and p˜∗ are given by






Therefore, for any c, γ ≥ 0, the indifference prices satisfy
0 ≤ p(γ, c) ≤ c p∗ ≤ p˜(γ, c) ≤ c e−r T .
(iv) Volume-scaling property: p(γ, c) = c p(cγ, 1) and p˜(γ, c) = c p˜(cγ, 1). This
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Therefore, p(γ, c) is an increasing and strictly concave function of c. Similar
straightforward calculations give the conclusion for the seller’s price.

















, with γ¯ := γ(1−R)e−rT .
The function h(γ) is negative since h(0) = 0 and h′(γ) = −c2γ¯eγ¯cAB(A +
eγ¯cB)−2 ≤ 0. Hence, p(γ, c) is decreasing in γ. The proof for p˜(γ, c) is similar
and thus omitted.
(iii) All the limits can be obtained by direct computation with l’Hopital’s
rule.
(iv) The volume-scaling property follows directly from the indifference price
formulas (3.18) via the expression for w(γ, c) in (3.11). This in turn leads to
the volume limits using (3.20).
Proposition 3.3 is best illustrated in Figure 3.1. On the left panel, we
present the buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices in terms of volume c for
various risk aversions. The seller’s price curve dominates the buyer’s curve for
all c. However, as the risk aversion reduces to zero, the buyer’s and seller’s
price curves bend towards to the straight line with slope p∗, the zero risk-
aversion limit price in (3.21). At the same time, the price difference shrinks
to zero. Moreover, at zero volume (c = 0), the buyer’s and seller’s price
curves both have slope p∗. On the right panel, we present the buyer’s and
seller’s indifference average prices in terms of c. As volume goes to infinity,
the average price p/c converges to the lower bound 0 and p˜/c converges to the
upper bound e−rT . On the other hand, as volume goes to zero, both average
prices converge to the zero risk-aversion price p∗.
For any fixed number c, the investor’s bid-ask spread is defined by
S(γ, c) := p˜(γ, c)− p(γ, c).
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Figure 3.1: The buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices in terms of trading
volume
(Left) As γ increases, with (0.2, 0.35, 0.5) along the arrows, p˜(γ, c) increases while
p(γ, c) decreases, leading to a wider bid-ask spread. The dotted line is the zero risk-
aversion price line. (Right) As trading volume c increases, the average indifference
prices, p(γ, c)/c and p˜(γ, c)/c, go to the limits 0 and e−rT respectively (γ = 0.3).
For both cases, the other parameters are T = 10, r = 2%, λ = 5%, η = 0.5774
(µ2 = 10%, σ2 = 20%), η1 = 0.5 (µ1 = 8%, σ1 = 16%), ρ = 0.5 and R = 40%.
In Figure 3.1, the bid-ask spread is the vertical distance between the buyer’s
and seller’s indifference prices. We can infer the bid-ask spread behavior from
Proposition 3.3, namely,
Corollary 3.4. The bid-ask spread S(γ, c) is increasing in γ and c.
The insight of this corollary is that the bid-ask spread widens as the in-
vestor becomes more risk averse or takes on a larger position. As a result,
our model allows us to quantify the contribution of risk aversion and trading
volume to the formation of bid-ask spreads for defaultable bonds. Lastly, we
emphasize that the indifference price properties are based on the investor’s be-
lief (Q). When dealing with multiple investors, their beliefs, described by the
parameters (µ1, σ1, µ2, σ2, ρ, λ), can differ. Then, their corresponding volume
or risk aversion limits are computed with their individual set of parameters.
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3.2.2 Optimal Trading with Linear Prices
We now investigate the buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions in the defaultable
bond when the market bid-ask prices are linear in quantity as described in
Section 3.1.1. To distinguish the buyer and the seller, we use the subscript
notation: b for the buyer and s for the seller. For example, we denote the
buyer’s risk aversion, default rate, market belief and value function by γb, λb,
Qb and Vb, respectively. The notation also applies to the other parameters
such as η and η1 which are subject to the buyer’s market belief Qb. Given the
ask price p¯i, the buyer selects the optimal long position c∗ that maximizes the
value function, namely,
c∗(γb, p¯i) = arg max
c≥0
Vb(0, x− cp¯i ; γb, c)
= arg max
c≥0
Vb(0, x+ p(γb, c)− cp¯i ; γb, 0)
= arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c)− cp¯i. (3.22)
The second equality follows from (3.16) and the last one from the increasing
monotonicity of the value function with respect to the wealth argument. Sim-
ilarly, given the bid price pi, the optimal short position for the seller with risk
aversion γs is given by
c˜∗(γs, pi) = arg max
c≥0
cpi − p˜(γs, c) . (3.23)
The buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices p and p˜ in (3.22) and (3.23) are
computed from (3.19) based on their own market beliefs Qb and Qs, respec-
tively. Also, the buyer’s and seller’s zero risk-aversion prices p∗ (w.r.t. Qb)
and p˜∗ (w.r.t. Qs) are computed from (3.21).
Proposition 3.5. Given the market bid-ask prices (pi, p¯i), with 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i ≤
e−rT , the buyer’s optimal position c∗(γb, p¯i) and the seller’s optimal position
c˜∗(γs, pi) at time 0 are given as follows:
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(−Re−r T + p¯i)Bb
)
> 0.
If p¯i ≥ p∗, then c∗(γb, p¯i) = 0.






(e−r T − pi)As
)
> 0.
If p˜∗ ≥ pi, then c˜∗(γs, pi) = 0.
The constants (Ab, Bb) and (As, Bs) are defined, respectively, corresponding to
buyer and seller according to (3.8) at time zero.
Proof. By Proposition 3.3, p(γb, c) is increasing, strictly concave, with deriva-
tive at c = 0: ∂p
∂c
(γb, 0) = p
∗. In case (i), if p∗ ≤ p¯i, then the function p(γb, c)−cp¯i
in (3.22) is always negative, so the buyer’s optimal position is zero. If p¯i < p∗,
then the optimal quantity c∗(γ, p¯i) is strictly positive and can be found from
the first-order condition. By similar arguments, since the seller’s price p˜(γs, c)
is increasing strictly convex with ∂p˜
∂c
(γs, 0) = p˜
∗, the seller will sell if and only
if p˜∗ < pi, which corresponds to case (ii).
By differentiating the optimal positions c∗ and c˜∗, we obtain the following
properties.
Corollary 3.6. The buyer’s optimal position c∗ is decreasing in γb, λb and p¯i.
The seller’s optimal position c˜∗ is decreasing in γs, but increasing in λs and
pi.
We observe that the risk-averse investor will never simultaneously take a
non-zero long and a non-zero short position in the defaultable bond even if
the market bid-ask spread is zero, i.e. pi = p¯i. This is due to the mutual
exclusiveness of the trade/no-trade conditions for the two opposite positions.
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← c* = 5.0261
← 0.3526


















← c* = 4.6206
← −0.3516
Figure 3.2: The buyer’s and seller’s option positions
(Left) The buyer’s optimal position when the p¯i = 0.2. (Right) The seller’s optimal
position when pi = 0.5. For both cases, γb = γs = 0.2 and the other parameters are
the same as in Figure 3.1.
Since p∗ = p˜∗ for a particular investor herself, the two conditions p¯i < p∗ and
p˜∗ < pi are mutually exclusive.
Alternatively, we can visualize the procedure of determining the optimal
position in Figure 3.2. As implied by (3.22), the buyer should search along the
indifference price curve for a point where the slope is p¯i, and the correspond-
ing volume on the x-axis is the optimal position. Suppose the market price
increases (holding other model parameters constant), then the buyer will have
to find a point on the price curve with a steeper slope. Due to the concavity
in c of the buyer’s indifference price, the optimal long position will move to
the left (i.e. reduce) as market price increases. Similarly, due to the convexity
in c of the seller’s indifference price, the optimal short position will move to
the right (i.e. increase) as market price increases. In summary, the buyer will
buy less and the seller will sell more defaultable bonds when the trading price
increases, and vice versa.
As the buyer optimally purchases c∗(γb, p¯i) defaultable bonds at the total
price of $c∗(γb, p¯i) p¯i, the benefit from taking this position is Bb = p(γb, c∗) −
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c∗p¯i ≥ 0. In Figure 3.2 (left), with γb = 0.2, c∗ = 5.0261 and p¯i = 0.2, the
benefit is Bb = 0.3526 which also coincides the intercept of the zero risk-
aversion price line. Similarly, as the investor optimally sells c∗(γs, p¯i) units of
the bond at the total price of $c∗(γs, pi)pi, the benefit is Bs = c∗pi−p˜(γs, c∗) ≥ 0.
In Figure 3.2 (right), with γs = 0.2, c
∗ = 4.6206 and pi = 0.5, the benefit is
Bs = 0.3516 which coincides the absolute value of the intercept of the zero
risk-aversion price line.























γ = 0.2, λ = 3%
γ = 0.2, λ = 5%
γ = 0.5, λ = 3%
γ = 0.5, λ = 5%






















γ = 0.2, λ = 3%
γ = 0.2, λ = 5%
γ = 0.5, λ = 3%
γ = 0.5, λ = 5%
Figure 3.3: The buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with the linear bid-ask
prices
(Left) The buyer’s optimal position as a function of p¯i ∈ [0, e−r T ], (Right) The
seller’s optimal position as a function of pi ∈ [0, e−r T ]. For both cases, the other
parameters are the same as in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the dependence of the optimal trading position on the
bid or ask price. As the risk aversion increases from 0.2 to 0.5, both c∗ and
c˜∗ decrease. Moreover, c∗ also decreases as the default intensity λb increases,
while c∗ increases as the default rate λs increases. All these patterns are
consistent with Corollary 3.6 above.
CHAPTER 3. TRADING OF DEFAULTABLE CLAIMS UNDER RISK
AVERSION AND BELIEF HETEROGENEITY 66
3.2.3 Optimal Trading with a Single Seller
We proceed to the trading position problem with a single risk-averse seller as
in Section 3.1.2. When the investor acts as a potential buyer, given the bid
pricing rule p˜(γs, c) of the seller, he/she selects the optimal long position c
∗
b
that maximizes the value function:
c∗b = arg max
c≥0
Vb(0, x− p˜(γs, c) ; γb, c)
= arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c)− ps(γs, c). (3.24)
Similarly, the seller’s optimal short position c∗s is given by
c∗s = arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c)− ps(γs, c). (3.25)
The optimal position depends on both buyer’ and seller’s risk aversions
(γb, γs) as well as their beliefs (Qb,Qs). As we show next, if the buyer and the
seller have the same belief, then it is optimal for both of them not to trade for
any (possibly different) risk aversions. In other words, risk aversion difference
alone does not trigger a trade between a buyer and a seller – the buyer and
the seller must have different views of the market in order for a trade to occur.
Proposition 3.7. Assume that the buyer and the seller have the same market
belief, i.e. Qb = Qs. For any arbitrarily fixed values of γb, γs > 0, the buyer
and seller find it optimal not to trade with each other.
Proof. Assume Qb = Qs. By Proposition 3.3, p˜(γs, c) dominates p(γb, c) for all
c ≥ 0, and the spread p(γb, c)− p˜(γs, c) decreases from zero as c increases from
zero. Therefore, it follows from (3.24) and (3.25) that c∗b = c
∗
s = 0.
Next, we establish the necessary and sufficient condition for a trade to
occur and provide a formula for the optimal trading position. To this end,
we denote by p∗ and p˜∗ respectively the buyer’s and seller’s zero risk-aversion
prices with respect to their own reference measures Qb and Qs.
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Proposition 3.8. The buyer’s optimal trading position is given as follows:
(i) If p∗ > p˜∗, then
c∗b =
1





> 0 . (3.26)
(ii) If p∗ ≤ p˜∗, then c∗b = 0.
The constants (Ab, Bb) and (As, Bs) are defined according to (3.8) with param-
eters corresponding to buyer and seller at time zero, respectively.
Proof. Since the function p(γb, c) − ps(γs, c) in (3.24) is strictly concave in c,
the optimal solution c∗b > 0 if and only if
∂
∂c
[p(γb, c)− ps(γs, c)]c=0 > 0 or
equivalently p∗b > p
∗
s according to (3.20). Finally, the first-order optimality
condition ∂
∂c
[p(γ, c)− ps(γ, c)] = 0 yields the explicit formula for c∗b in (3.26).
As we can see, the trade condition p∗ > p˜∗ plays a critical role to trigger a
trade between the buyer and the seller.
Corollary 3.9. The optimal trading position c∗b is decreasing in γb, γs, λb, but
increasing in λs.
The financial intuition of these results is illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.4.
First, we recall that, in the case with identical belief, the seller’s price always
dominates the buyer’s price, as previously shown in Figure 3.1, and therefore
no trade will occur. In Figure 3.4, the trade condition p∗ > p˜∗ implies that
the seller’s price curve lies below the buyer’s price curve for a range of c, so
the optimal position is positive and is found within this range. As indicated
by (3.26), a higher risk aversion of the buyer and/or the seller reduces the
optimal trading position. In Figure 3.4, as the buyer’s risk aversion increases
from 0.2 to 0.5, the optimal position decreases from 2.9329 to 1.6934.
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Figure 3.4: The buyer’s optimal positions with a single seller
(Left) The buyer’s optimal position c∗ = 2.9329 when γb = γs = 0.2. (Right) The
buyer’s optimal position c∗ = 1.6934 when γb = 0.5 and γs = 0.2. For both cases,
λb = 5%, λs = 10% and the other parameters are the same as in Figure 3.1.
Remark 3.10. The formula (3.26) holds even if γb or γs takes value zero. If






(−Re−r T + p˜∗)Bb
)
> 0 , and c∗s(γ, pi) = 0 .
(3.27)
When γs = 0, the seller’s pricing rule is linear. Therefore, we can also apply
Proposition 3.5 to get (3.26) by substituting pi = p˜∗. By the same arguments,
when γb = 0, we obtain






(e−r T − p∗)Bs
(−Re−rT + p∗)As
)
> 0 . (3.28)
In the special case of γb = γs = 0, (3.26) indicates that c
∗
b = +∞ if
p∗b > p
∗
s. This is consistent with (3.24) because the buyer’s per-unit price
dominates the seller’s, and therefore, it is optimal for the buyer to take an
infinite long position.
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3.2.4 Optimal Trading with Multiple Sellers
Turning to the case with multiple sellers, we apply the subscript notation b
and si, i ∈ N to distinguish the buyer and the multiple sellers. The buyer’s
optimal long position is found from


















In preparation for the following results, we denote p∗ and p˜∗i , i ∈ N as
the buyer’s and seller i’s zero risk-aversion prices based on their respective
beliefs. Define N 0 := {i ∈ N : p∗ ≤ p˜i} which is the set of sellers whose zero
risk-aversion prices dominate the buyer’s. Denote the set of remaining sellers
by N 1 = N\N 0. We call the set N 1 and N 0 the trade and no-trade sets,
respectively. As we will show below, the buyer will purchase from seller i if
and only if seller i ∈ N 1.
Proposition 3.11. The buyer’s optimal position in each seller i ∈ N , denoted
by c∗i , satisfies that
c∗i > 0 if i ∈ N 1 or c∗i = 0 if i ∈ N 0.









, ∀i ∈ N 1. (3.29)
Proof. Recall that p(γb, c) is strictly concave in c and p˜i(γsi, ci) is strictly
convex in ci. If p
∗ ≤ p˜i, with other components cj, j 6= i, arbitrarily fixed, then
the trading benefit Bb(~c) := p(γb, c¯)−
∑N
i=1 p˜i(γsi , ci) decreases as ci increases
from 0. Therefore, c∗i = 0 for i ∈ N 0. If i ∈ N 1, then ∂Bb(c1,...,cN )∂ci |ci=0 > 0, so
c∗i > 0 and is determined from the first-order condition.
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Proposition 3.12. The buyer’s optimal trading position c∗i is decreasing in γb
and γsi.
Proof. The partial derivative ∂cp(γb, c) is decreasing in γb and ∂cp˜(γsi , c) is

















Applying these properties and the concavity/convexity of p and p˜ in c to the
first-order condition in (3.29), we conclude that c∗i is decreasing in γb and
γsi .
Next, we will discuss some interesting market phenomena implied by this
result. Denote M(P ) ⊆ N to be the set of all sellers who share a certain
market view P , so Qsi = P for every i ∈ M(P ). In particular, M(Qb) is the
set of sellers whose beliefs coincide with the buyer’s, but they may differ in
risk aversion.
Corollary 3.13. For each seller i whose belief coincides with the buyer’s i.e.
i ∈M(Qb), the risk-averse buyer’s optimal position is c∗i = 0.
Furthermore, if all the sellers have the same market view as the buyer’s,
i.e. M(Qb) = N , then even with heterogeneous risk aversions, it is optimal
for all parties not to trade, yielding c∗ = (0, . . . , 0). In other words, belief
heterogeneity is a necessary condition for a trade to occur in the multi-seller
market.
Suppose some sellers with a certain market view also have identical risk
aversion (both possibly different from the buyer’s). These sellers have their
common indifference price function, and therefore, by (3.29) of Proposition
3.11, the buyer will acquire the same quantity from each of the sellers.
Corollary 3.14. Suppose that more than one seller share their beliefs (Qs)
and risk aversions γs > 0, i.e. |M(Qs)| ≥ 2 and γsi = γs ∀i ∈ M(Qs). If
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the sellers satisfy the trade condition i.e. M(Qs) ⊆ N 1, then every seller in
M(Qs) has equal and positive trading volume with the buyer, i.e. c∗j = c∗k > 0
for j, k ∈M(Qs).
In essence, the buyer will equally allocate his trading volume in any group of
identical sellers. Nevertheless, the computation of c∗i requires the information
of all other sellers in the market.
Furthermore, in a market with N homogeneous sellers (with the same risk
aversion and market view), we infer from Corollary 3.14 that the buyer will
either not trade with any of these sellers, or purchase the same quantity from
each seller. In the latter case, the N sellers have equal market shares, but the
total trading volume depends on the number of sellers in the market.
Proposition 3.15. In a market of homogeneous sellers, i.e. γsi = γs ∀i ∈ N
and |M(Qs)| = N for some γs and Qs, the buyer’s optimal position in each
seller is given as follows:
(i) If p∗ > p˜∗, then
c∗b(N) =
1






(ii) If p∗ ≤ p˜∗, then c∗b(N) = 0.
Corollary 3.16. When the number of homogeneous sellers goes to the infinity,
the buyer’s total optimal position satisfies that limN→∞Nc∗b(N) = c
∗
b , where
c∗b is given in (3.27).
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′)− p˜∗ c′ = c∗b ,
where the third equality follows from setting c′ = Nc.
Therefore, in the case with infinitely many homogeneous sellers, the risk-
averse buyer’s total volume is the same as the scenario when he/she trades
with a single seller with zero risk-aversion and the same market belief as the
homogeneous sellers. Clearly, the quantity c∗b(N) for each homogeneous seller
decreases to zero as N increases to infinity. Nevertheless, the buyer’s total vol-
ume Nc∗b(N) actually increases with N and admits the limit given by Corollary
3.16.
Finally, we provide further analytic results and numerical examples for the
case with two heterogeneous sellers. Recall from (3.21) that p∗ and p˜∗i , i = 1, 2,
represent the buyer’s and seller i’s zero risk-aversion prices.
Proposition 3.17. (Two-Seller Case) The buyer’s optimal static position
c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2) is given as follows:
(i) if p∗ > p˜∗i , for i = 1, 2, then
c∗1 =
1




























(ii) If p∗ > p˜∗1 and p
∗ ≤ p˜∗2, then
c∗1 =
1






> 0 , and c∗2 = 0 .
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(iii) If p∗ ≤ p˜∗1 and p∗ > p˜∗2, then















Here, the constants (Ab, Bb) and (Asi , Bsi), i = 1, 2 are defined according to
(3.8) with parameters corresponding to buyer and seller i, i = 1, 2, at time
zero, respectively.
The proof follows from that of Proposition 3.11 and is thus omitted. Here,
each trade condition p∗ > p˜∗i , for i = 1, 2, checks whether seller i is in the
trade set N 1 and guarantees that the optimal solution is in the interior of
the domain [0,∞)2. In this case, the optimal positions with both sellers are
strictly positive. If one of these inequalities is violated, then the problem is
reduced to the single-seller case which has been solved in Proposition 3.8.
In case (i), each seller’s trading volume depends on the other competing
seller’s market view and risk aversion. In particular, if the competing seller
becomes less risk averse, then she tends to get a larger share of the buyer’s
position. Nevertheless, in cases (ii) and (iii) where only one seller trades with
the buyer, the trading volume is not affected by the other non-trading seller.
Figures 3.5 shows the buyer’s optimal position under two cases (i) and
(ii). Interestingly, if the sellers have the same risk aversion and market view,
but their common market view does not coincide with the buyer’s, then the
two sellers will equally share the sales volume (left panel). In the case that
the buyer does not buy from one of the sellers (right panel), we see that the
optimal solution lies on the boundary of the (c1, c2) domain. In Figure 3.6
(left), we see that a less risk averse seller will gain a larger share of the total
volume because she offers more competitive (or lower) prices to the buyer. On
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the other hand, when a seller believes a higher probability of default, she will
be willing to sell the defaultable bonds at lower prices, and thus capturing a
larger market share, as shown in Figure 3.6 (right).
We end this section by studying the case when the buyer pre-specifies α > 0
units of the defaultable bond to purchase from the sellers. As discussed in
Section 3.1 (see (3.2)), the buyer’s optimal position solves the cost optimization
problem:
cα∗1 = arg min
0≤c1≤α
p˜1(γs1, c1) + p˜2(γs2, α− c1) ,
cα∗2 = α− cα∗1 .
Note that the function g(c1) := p˜1(γs1, c1) + p˜2(γs2, α− c1) is strictly con-
vex in c1. The buyer will purchase all from seller 1 if g
′(α) ≤ 0; purchase all
from seller 2 if g′(0) ≥ 0; or buy positive units of the defaultable bond from
both sellers. Re-writing these conditions using the explicit indifference price
expressions, we obtain the buyer’s optimal static position
cα∗1 =

α if h(α) ≥ α,
h(α) if 0 < h(α) < α,














with γ¯si = γsi (1−R) e−r T , i = 1, 2. In particular, the buyer will purchase all
α units of defaultable bonds from seller 1 in the first case, and from seller 2
in the third case in (3.30). As α increases from 0, the location of the optimal
position (cα∗1 , c
α∗
2 ) will trace out a straight line from an intercept, as shown by
the dark straight line at the bottom of the graphs in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Each
point on the blue line indicates the buyer’s optimal trading positions with the
two sellers for a specific α (0 ≤ α ≤ 10).
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Figure 3.5: The buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers
(Left) When both sellers are identical, the buyer purchases from both sellers c∗1 =
0.817, c∗2 = 0.817 with λs1 = λs2 = 10%, λb = 5%. (Right) When the buyer
purchases from seller 1 only: c∗1 = 1.23, c∗2 = 0 with λb = λs2 = 5%, λs1 = 10%. For
both cases, γb = γs1 = γs2 = 0.5 and the other parameters are the same as in Figure
3.1.
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Figure 3.6: The buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers
(Left) The two sellers differ only in risk aversion, with γs1 = 0.2, γs2 = 1 and
λs1 = λs2 = 10%. γb = 0.5 and λb = 5%. The less risk-averse seller captures a larger
market share: c∗1 = 1.532, c∗2 = 0.306. (Right) The two sellers differ only in their
market views, with λs1 = 8% , λs2 = 10% while λb = 5% and γb = γs1 = γs2 = 0.5.
Seller 2 gains a larger market share: c∗1 = 0.2479, c∗2 = 1.1016. For both cases, the
other parameters are the same as in Figure 3.1.
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3.3 Utility-Indifference Pricing and Optimal
Trading of CDS
Credit default swaps (CDS) played a critical role in the 2008 financial crisis,
and their market has undergone significant changes since then. Before 2009,
market participants could trade CDS without initial upfront fees. Currently,
CDS contracts are traded in a new standardized way whereby the protection
buyer pays at a fixed premium rate and pay/receive a non-zero upfront pay-
ment at the start of the contract. The fixed standardized premium rate is
100 basis points (bps) for investment grade references and 500bps for non-
investment grade references in North America1.
Let us consider a CDS with unit notional, a fixed premium rate κ, and
expiration date T . If the reference entity defaults at time τ ≤ T , then the buyer
stops paying the premium and receives the discounted amount $(1 − R)e−rT
from the protection seller. We use the same notations and assumptions for
the tradable assets and default risk as in Section 3.2. Prior to default, the
investor’s discounted trading wealth satisfies





t (µi dt+ σi dW
(i)
t ), t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ],




t ) represents the discounted cash amounts invested in
S(1) and S(2) respectively. After default, the investor only trades the non-
defaultable asset S(1) and solves the Merton problem (3.4). With c ∈ R units
of the CDS, the investor solves the utility maximization problem:




U(X˜T ) 1{τ>T} +M
(
τ, X˜τ + (1−R) c e−r T
)




1According to “CDS Big Bang: Understanding the Changes to the Global CDS Contract
and North American Conventions”, Markit Magazine, 2009.
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3.3.1 Bid-Ask Upfront Prices
We apply the utility indifference pricing approach to derive the pricing rules
for the protection buyer and seller. To facilitate the presentation, we define
F (t; c, κ) = e(γ cκ−α) (T−t) and G(c, κ) =
λ e−γ (1−R) c e
−r T




We note that G(c, κ) does not depend on time t.
Proposition 3.18. The value function V˜ (t, x; γ, c, κ) is given by
V˜ (t, x; γ, c, κ) = −e−γ x v(t; γ, c, κ) , (3.32)















(1−G(c, κ))F (t; c, κ) +G(c, κ) e− 12η21(T−t) if α 6= γ cκ+ η21
2
.(3 34)




, t ≤ u < τ ∧ T .















































Substituting (3.32) into (3.35) gives an ODE for v(t) ≡ v(t; γ, c, κ):
v′(t) + (γ c κ− α)v(t) + λeγ c (1−R)e−rT− 12η21(T−t) = 0 , (3.37)
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with v(T ) = 1. The explicit solution is given by (3.33) and (3.34). We
can easily check that v(t; γ, c, κ) is continuous in c and well-defined. Finally,
applying (3.32) to the optimal θ˜∗ in (3.35), we get θ˜∗(t, x) = (Σ−1 µ)/γ, for
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
We now define the indifference bid-ask upfront prices of a CDS.
Definition 3.19. At time t, the protection buyer’s (resp. seller’s) indifference
bid (resp., ask) upfront price for c ≥ 0 units of a CDS with premium rate κ
is defined by the cash amount p(t; γ, c, κ) ≡ p(t, x, y; γ, c, κ) (resp. p˜(t; γ, c, κ))
satisfying
V˜ (t, x, y ; γ, 0, κ) = V˜ (t, x− p(t; γ, c, κ), y ; γ, c, κ) , (3.38)
V˜ (t, x, y ; γ, 0, κ) = V˜ (t, x+ p˜(t; γ, c, κ), y ; γ,−c, κ) . (3.39)
Applying (3.32) to (3.38) and (3.39), we express the indifference bid and
ask upfront prices for fixed premium κ at time t:





v(t; γ, c, κ)








where v(t; 0) ≡ v(t; 0, 0, 0). As long as c = 0, the value of v(t; γ, c, κ) does not
depend on γ or κ. By direction substitution of (3.40) into (3.37) yields the
ODEs for the indifference prices.
Proposition 3.20. The buyer’s and seller’s indifference upfront prices p(t) ≡














−rT − 1) = 0 , (3.42)
with the terminal conditions p(T ) = 0 and p˜(T ) = 0.
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For notational convenience, we write in this section
p(γ, c, κ) ≡ p(0; γ, c, κ), p˜(γ, c, κ) ≡ p˜(0; γ, c, κ), (3.43)
v(γ, c, κ) ≡ v(0; γ, c, κ), v(0) ≡ v(0; 0, 0, 0) and F (c, κ) ≡ F (0; c, κ) .
(3.44)




which has the following explicit expression:
v(1) =

−(1−R)λT e−(r+ 12η21)T−γ(1−R)ce−rT if α = γ cκ+ η21
2
,






η21 T − F (c, κ))
(
κ
α−γ κ c− 1
2
η21
− (1−R) e−r T
)
Proposition 3.21. The CDS protection buyer’s and seller’s indifference up-
front prices have the following properties:
(i) Concavity/convexity in c: for c ≥ 0, p(γ, c, κ) is strictly concave in c,
and p˜(γ, c, κ) is strictly convex in c.
(ii) Monotonicity in γ: p(γ, c, κ) is decreasing and p˜(γ, c, κ) is increasing in
γ.


















= p˜∗ , (3.46)
where the zero risk-aversion upfront prices p∗ and p˜∗ are given by




where v(0) and v(0, 0, κ) are defined in (3.44). Therefore, for any γ, c ≥
0, the following inequalities hold:
−c κ T ≤ p(γ, c, κ) ≤ c p∗ ≤ p˜(γ, c, κ) ≤ c e−rT (1−R) .
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(iv) Volume-scaling property: p(γ, c, κ) = c p(cγ, 1, κ) and p˜(γ, c, κ) = c p˜(cγ, 1, κ).



















Proof. (i) For any 0 ≤ c1, c2 <∞ and θ ∈ (0, 1), we define p¯(t) := θ p(t; c1) +
(1 − θ) p(t; c2) and c¯ := θ c1 + (1 − θ) c2. To show the strict concavity of
p(t; c) ≡ p(t; γ, c, κ), it is sufficient to show that the convex combination p¯(t)
is a super-solution of the ODE for p(t; c¯):





(eγ (p(t;c¯)−c¯ l) − 1) = 0, (3.48)
with l := (1−R)e−rT . Substituting p¯(t; θ, c1, c2) into (3.48), we get













θeγ(p(t;c1)−c1 l) + (1− θ)eγ(p(t;c2)−c2 l) − eγ(θ(p(t;c1)−c1 l)+(1−θ)(p(t;c2)−c2 l)))
> 0.
The equality comes from the fact that both p(t; c1) and p(t; c2) satisfy the
ODE (3.41). The inequality holds since v(t; 0) > 0 and eγ x is a strictly convex
function of x for γ > 0. Hence, p¯(t; θ, c1, c2) is a super-solution of (3.48) and
thus, p(t; c) is strictly concave in c (see [Khalil, 2002, Lemma 3.4]). Similar
arguments yield the strict convexity of p˜(t; γ, c, κ).























0. Therefore, p(γ, c, κ) is decreasing in γ. Similar arguments conclude that
p˜(γ, c, κ) is increasing in γ.
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(iii) All the limits can be obtained by direct computation using l’Hopital’s
rule.
(iv) The volume-scaling property can be easily inferred from the indiffer-
ence upfront formulas (3.40) via the expression for v(γ, c, κ) in (3.34).






















Zero Risk Aversion Upfront Line























Zero Risk Aversion Upfront Line
Figure 3.7: The indifference upfronts in terms of trading volume
As γ ∈ {0.2, 0.35, 0.5} increases along the arrows, p(γ, c, κ) decreases while p˜(γ, c, κ)
increases, leading to a wider bid-ask spread. The dotted line is the zero risk-aversion
upfront line with slope p∗. (Left) High default rate case with λ = 5%. (Right) Low
default rate case with λ = 1%. For both cases, κ = 0.01, T = 5 and the other
parameters are the same as in Figure 3.1.
We can visualize Proposition 3.21 in Figure 3.7. The seller’s upfront price
curve dominates the buyer’s curve for all volume c. Moreover, at zero volume
(c = 0), the buyer’s and seller’s upfront curves both have slope p∗ if they have
the same market belief (Q).
Unlike the defaultable bond case, the indifference upfront prices p and
p˜ both can be negative depending on the parameters, especially the relative
values of the default rate λ and premium rate κ. If the default risk is very
high, the seller may require the buyer to pay initial upfront on top of the fixed
premium. However, if the default rate is very low, then the buyer may need
to receive an upfront fee to compensate the relatively high fixed premium.
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The protection seller may also find it acceptable to pay a positive upfront fee
(meaning a negative indifference price) in exchange for the premium payments
from the buyer if the likelihood of future liability from default is very small.
On the right panel of Figure 3.7, both p and p˜ take negative values for some
intervals of c.
Moreover, as either c or γ goes to∞, the buyer’s indifference upfront price
p decreases to −∞, since the average bid upfront p/c converges to the negative
lower bound −κT < 0. On the other hand, the seller’s indifference upfront
price p˜ increases to ∞, since the the average ask upfront p˜/c converges to the
positive upper bound e−rT (1−R) > 0.
3.3.2 Optimal Trading with Linear Upfront Prices
Given a linear pricing rule with an ask upfront fee p¯i, the buyer’s optimal long
position is given by
c∗(γb, p¯i, κ) = arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c, κ)− cp¯i, (3.49)
where γb denotes the buyer’s risk aversion. Similarly, given the per-unit bid
upfront price pi, the seller selects the optimal short position via
c˜∗(γs, pi, κ) = arg max
c≥0
cpi − p˜(γs, c, κ). (3.50)
We denote by p∗ and p˜∗ the buyer’s and the seller’s zero risk-aversion up-
front prices (see (3.47)) based on their own reference measures Qb and Qs,
respectively. We again use the subscripts b and s to distinguish the buyer and
seller.
Proposition 3.22. Given the market bid-ask upfronts (pi, p¯i), with −κT ≤
pi ≤ p¯i ≤ e−rT (1−R), the buyer’s optimal position c∗(γb, p¯i, κ) and the seller’s
optimal position c˜∗(γs, p¯i, κ) are given as follows:
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∗, κ) + p¯i vb(γb, c∗, κ) = 0. (3.51)
Otherwise, c∗(γb, p¯i, κ) = 0.
(ii) If p˜∗ < pi, then c˜∗(γs, pi, κ) > 0 is a unique solution of the equation:
v(1)s (γs,−c∗, κ) + pi vs(γs,−c∗, κ) = 0. (3.52)
Otherwise, c˜∗(γs, pi, κ) = 0.
Proof. The arguments for the trade/no-trade scenarios follow from the proof
of Proposition 3.5. By Proposition 3.21, p(γb, c, κ) is strictly concave with
∂p
∂c
(γb, 0, κ) = p
∗ and p˜(γs, c, κ) is strictly convex with
∂p˜
∂c
(γs, 0, κ) = p˜
∗. Dif-
ferentiating p(γb, c, κ)− cp¯i in (3.49) and cpi − p˜(γs, c, κ) in (3.50) w.r.t. c and
applying first-order conditions give (3.51) and (3.52).
From (3.51) and (3.52) above, we can deduce by differentiation the follow-
ing properties.
Corollary 3.23. The buyer’s optimal position c∗ is decreasing in γb and p¯i.
The seller’s optimal position c˜∗ is decreasing in γs but increasing in pi.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates how the buyer’s (resp. seller’s) optimal CDS po-
sition is where the indifference upfront curve has a slope of value p¯i (resp.
pi). Also, the buyer will buy less and the seller will sell more CDS when
the market upfront increases, and vice versa. When the buyer purchases
c∗(γb, p¯i, κ) units of CDS at the total upfront payment of $c∗(γb, p¯i, κ) p¯i, the
benefit is measured by Bb := p(γb, c∗, κ) − c∗p¯i ≥ 0. On the left panel of
Figure 3.8, with γb = 0.2, c
∗ = 5.8173,p¯i = 0.03 and κ = 0.01, the benefit
is p(0.2, 0.03, 0.01) − 0.03 · 5.8173 = 0.1549 which has the same value as the
intercept of the market upfront line. Similarly, the seller’s benefit can also be
read off from the absolute value of the market upfront line intercept on the
right panel of Figure 3.8.
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← c* = 4.6783← −0.1523
Figure 3.8: The buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with linear bid-ask up-
fronts
(Left) The buyer’s optimal position c∗ when p¯i = 0.03. (Right) The seller’s optimal
position c˜∗ when pi = 0.15. For both cases, γ = 0.2 and the other parameters are
the same as in Figure 3.7.
3.3.3 Optimal Trading with a Single Seller
When trading with a single seller, the protection buyer pays the upfront price
p˜(γs, c, κ) required by the seller and selects the optimal long position c
∗
b that
maximizes the value function:
c∗b = arg max
c≥0
V˜b(0, x− ps(γs, c, κ) ; γb, c, κ)
= arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c, κ)− ps(γs, c, κ).
From the protection seller’s perspective, her optimal short position c∗s also
maximizes the price spread, namely,
c∗s = arg max
c≥0
p(γb, c, κ)− ps(γs, c, κ).
Proposition 3.24. If p∗ > p˜∗, then the buyer’s optimal trading position c∗b is
found from
vb(γb, c, κ) v
(1)
s (γs,−c, κ) = vs(γs,−c, κ) v(1)b (γb, c, κ). (3.53)
Otherwise, c∗b = c
∗
s = 0.
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Proof. Since the function p(γb, c, κ) − ps(γs, c, κ) is strictly concave in c, the
optimal solution c∗b > 0 if and only if
∂
∂c
[p(γb, c, κ)− ps(γs, c, κ)]c=0 > 0 or
equivalently p∗ > p˜∗ according to (3.46). Finally, the first-order optimality
condition ∂
∂c
[p(γb, c, κ)− ps(γs, c, κ)] = 0 yields the equation (3.53).
Corollary 3.25. The optimal trading position c∗b is decreasing in γb and γs.
Corollary 3.26. Let Qb = Qs. For any arbitrarily fixed values of γb, γs > 0,
the buyer and seller find it optimal not to trade with each other.
Regardless of the difference in risk aversion, if the buyer and the seller
have the same market belief Qb = Qs, then the seller’s upfront price always
dominate the buyer’s (see Figure 3.7) and no trade occurs. In Figure 3.9, the
condition p∗ > p˜∗ in Proposition 3.24 implies that the seller’s upfront curve
lies below the buyer’s upfront curve for a range of c, so the optimal position
is positive. A higher risk aversion of the buyer and/or the seller reduces the
optimal trading position. In Figure 3.9, as the buyer’s risk aversion increases
from 0.2 to 0.5, the optimal position decreases from 2.9329 to 1.6934.
3.3.4 Optimal Trading with Multiple Sellers
For the buyer’s trading problem involving multiple sellers, we use the subscript
notation b and si, i ∈ N to distinguish the buyer and the multiple sellers. The
buyer selects the optimal long position c∗ that maximizes the value function.
Precisely,














p˜i(γsi , ci, κ),
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Figure 3.9: The CDS buyer’s and seller’s optimal positions with a single dealer
The optimal position c∗ locates the maximum difference between the buyer’s upfront
(solid) and the seller’s upfront (dashed) curves. As the buyer’s risk aversion γb
increases from 0.2 to 0.5 (left panel to right panel), the buyer’s upfront curve moves
downward, and c∗ shifts to the left from 2.9329 to 1.6934. For both cases, γs = 0.2
and the other parameters are the same as in Figure 3.7.
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where c¯ =
∑N
i=1 ci. Similarly, the seller’s optimal short position c˜
∗ is given by




pi(γbi , ci, κ)− p˜(γs, c¯, κ).
Since the buyer’s (resp. seller’s) indifference upfront p(γb, c, κ) (resp. p˜(γs, c, κ))
is strictly concave (resp. convex) in c, Proposition 3.11, and Corollaries 3.13
and 3.14 hold as well if we replace the buyer’s indifference bond price with
the buyer’s indifference upfront price, and the seller i’s indifference price with
the seller i’s indifference upfront. The buyer’s trade condition for CDS seller
i ∈ N is p∗ > p˜∗i , where p∗ and p˜∗i are the buyer’s and seller i’s zero risk-aversion
upfront prices based on their respective beliefs.
As a special case, in a market with N homogeneous sellers (with identical
risk aversion and market view), Corollary 3.14 suggests that the buyer will
either not trade with any of these sellers, or purchase the same quantity of the
CDS from each seller.
Proposition 3.27. In a market of homogeneous sellers, i.e. γsi = γs ∀i ∈ N
and |M(Qs)| = N for some γs and Qs, the buyer’s optimal position in every
seller c∗b(N) is a unique solution of the equation
vb(γb, c, κ) v
(1)
s (Nγs,−c, κ) = vs(Nγs,−c, κ) v(1)b (γb, c, κ).
Recall from (3.47) that p∗ and p˜∗i , i = 1, 2, represent the buyer’s and seller
i’s zero risk-aversion upfront prices. The proof is omitted since it follows from
that of Proposition 3.11 by replacing p(γb, c) and p˜i(γsi , c) with p(γb, c, κ) and
p˜i(γsi , c, κ).
Proposition 3.28. (Two-Seller Case) The buyer’s optimal static position
c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2) in two sellers is given as follows:
(i) If p∗ > p˜∗i , for i = 1, 2, then c
∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2) is the unique solution of the
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following system
vb(γb, c1 + c2, κ) v
(1)
s1
(γs1 ,−c1, κ) = vs1(γs1 ,−c1, κ) v(1)b (γb, c1 + c2, κ),
vb(γb, c1 + c2, κ) v
(1)
s2
(γs2 ,−c2, κ) = vs2(γs2 ,−c2, κ) v(1)b (γb, c1 + c2, κ).
(ii) If p∗ > p˜∗1 and p
∗ ≤ p˜∗2, then c∗1 is the unique solution of the equation
vb(γb, c1, κ) v
(1)
s (γs1 ,−c1, κ) = vs1(γs1,−c1, κ) v(1)b (γb, c1, κ) and c∗2 = 0.
(iii) If p∗ ≤ p˜∗1 and p∗ > p˜∗2, then c∗2 is the unique solution of the equation
vb(γb, c2, κ) v
(1)
s2
(γs2 ,−c2, κ) = vs2(γs2 ,−c2, κ) v(1)b (γb, c2, κ) and c∗1 = 0.
(iv) If p∗ ≤ p˜∗i , for i = 1, 2, then c∗1 = c∗2 = 0.
For each seller i ∈ {1, 2}, the trade condition p∗ > p˜∗i guarantees a non-zero
trade with the buyer. If one of these inequalities is violated, then the problem
is reduced to the single-seller case, and the CDS buyer only trades with the
seller who satisfies the trade condition. In cases (ii) and (iii), only one seller
trades with the buyer, and the trading volume is not affected by the other
non-trading seller. Otherwise, in case (i), each seller’s trading volume depends
on the other seller’s market view and risk aversion.
In Figure 3.10, both sellers satisfy the trade condition. A less risk averse
seller will gain a larger share of the total volume due to a more competitive
(or lower) upfront price (left panel). On the other hand, if one seller believes
in a higher default rate than the other, a higher upfront fee will be charged to
the buyer, leading the buyer to purchase less from this expensive seller (right
panel).
As discussed in Section 3.1 (see (3.2)), we can also determine the buyer’s
optimal position when the position is pre-specified at α > 0 units of CDS. The
buyer minimizes the total trading cost ĝ(c1) := p˜1(γs1, c1, κ) + p˜2(γs2, α− c1, κ)
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Figure 3.10: The CDS buyer’s optimal positions with two sellers
(Left) The two sellers differ only in risk aversion and have same views on the other
paramters, with γs1 = 0.2, γs2 = γb = 0.5 and λs1 = λs2 = 3%, λb = 5%. The less
risk-averse seller captures a larger market share: c∗1 = 1.1011, c∗2 = 0.4304. (Right)
The two sellers differ only in their market views with λs1 = 3% , λs2 = 3.5% and
have the same risk aversion with γb = γs1 = γs2 = 0.5. Seller 1 gains a larger market
share: c∗1 = 0.7207, c∗2 = 0.5205. For both cases, the other parmeters are the same
as in Figure 3.7.
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which is strictly convex in c1 ∈ [0, α]. Therefore, the buyer will purchase all
from seller 1 if ĝ′(α) ≤ 0; purchase all from seller 2 if ĝ′(0) ≥ 0; or buy positive
units of the CDS from both sellers. Expressing these inequalities in terms of
v and v(1) yields the buyer’s optimal trade allocation
cα∗1 =

α if vs2(γs2 , 0, κ) v
(1)
s1 (γs1 ,−α, κ) ≥ vs1(γs1 ,−α, κ) v(1)s2 (γs2 , 0, κ),
0 if vs1(γs1 , 0, κ) v
(1)
s2 (γs2 ,−α, κ) ≥ vs2(γs2 ,−α, κ) v(1)s1 (γs1 , 0, κ),
ĥ(α) ∈ (0, α) otherwise,
and cα∗2 = α− cα∗1 . In the third case, for any fixed positive α, ĥ(α) is uniquely
determined from the equation
vs1(γs1 ,−ĥ, κ) v(1)s2 (γs2 , ĥ− α, κ) = vs2(γs2 , ĥ− α, κ) v(1)s1 (γs1 ,−ĥ, κ).
In particular, the buyer will purchase all α units of CDS from seller 1 in the
first case, and all from seller 2 in the second case in (3.3.4). As α increases
from 0, the location of the optimal position (cα∗1 , c
α∗
2 ) will trace out a straight
line from an intercept, as shown by the dark straight line at the bottom of the
graphs in Figure 3.10.
3.3.5 Bid-Ask Premia
We close this section by briefly discussing the prior industry standard of setting
a fixed upfront fee (e.g. zero for unfunded CDS) followed by determining the
premium. In this case, we define the bid-ask premia via utility-indifference.
Definition 3.29. At time 0, the protection buyer’s (resp. seller’s) indifference
premium for c ≥ 0 units of a CDS with a fixed unit upfront fee f0 is defined
by the total spread amount κ∗ ≡ κ∗(γ, c, f0) (resp. κ˜∗ ≡ κ˜∗(γ, c, f0)) satisfying
V˜ (0, x ; γ, 0, 0) = V˜
(





V˜ (0, x ; γ, 0, 0) = V˜
(
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where V˜ is defined in (3.31).
Applying (3.32) to (3.54) and (3.55), the buyer’s and seller’s indifference




) = v(0)e−γcf0 and v(γ,−c, κ˜
∗(γ, c, f0)
c
) = v(0)eγcf0 .
where v is defined in (3.44). Among various properties of the utility-indifference




























η21 T − e−αT ) (1−R) e−r T − f0(α− 12η21 + λ(e−
1
2




η21) (α− 12η21 − λ)T e−αT + λ (e−
1
2
η21 T − e−αT ) .
In the special case when the upfront fee is zero (f0 = 0) and the buyer and
the seller do not incorporate investment in stocks (η = η1 = 0), the zero
risk-aversion premium reduces to
κ¯ = λ(1−R)e−rT ,
which is the well known credit triangle formula for risk-neutral CDS pre-
mium (see, for example, [O’Kane, 2011, Chap. 3.10]). Finally, we also have
the volume-scaling property: κ∗(γ, c, f0) = c κ∗(cγ, 1, f0) and κ˜∗(γ, c, f0) =
c κ˜∗(cγ, 1, f0), which then yields the same large and small volume asymptotics
as in (3.56).
3.4 Conclusion
In summary, we have discussed a utility-based trading mechanism for default-
able claims in markets with different pricing rules and agents with heteroge-
neous risk aversions and market views. Working with exponential utility, we
CHAPTER 3. TRADING OF DEFAULTABLE CLAIMS UNDER RISK
AVERSION AND BELIEF HETEROGENEITY 93
obtain formulas for the buyer’s and seller’s pricing rules and optimal trading
positions for both defaultable bonds and CDS. These results allow us to better
understand the interaction between market prices and risk aversion, market
view, as well as trading volume. Most interestingly, the belief heterogeneity
and the zero-risk aversion prices are important inputs for determining whether
the buyer will trade with any seller and vice versa.
Our framework can be applied to study the trading of other financial deriva-
tives, such as equity options, volatility derivatives, and insurance products.
One extension of the static trading problem is to consider the optimal timing
to buy or sell assets or derivatives (see Leung and Ludkovski [2012]). For these
applications, explicit formulas for the buyer’s and seller’s indifference prices,
if available, can greatly facilitate the analysis. To design alternative pricing
rules, one can also apply results from risk measures, prospect theory, and
other utility maximization approaches to the investor’s portfolio optimization
problem, as long as the model remains amenable for analysis or numerically
tractable.
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Chapter 4
Impact of Central Counterparty
Design on the Credit Default
Swap Market
In this chapter, we consider a model for an inter-dealer market of credit default
swaps (CDS) with a central counterparty (CCP). We analyze the equilibrium
demands for clearing CDS among all dealers, especially its dependence on the
design of the CCP. This involves solving the dealers’ portfolio optimization
problems under the market clearing condition. We determine the minimum
number of clearing participants required to create sufficient incentive for the
dealers to use the clearing service. We also find that the CCP can increase the
total clearing positions and its profit by reducing its initial margin level.
In Section 4.1, we formulate the equilibrium model and provide solution to
the dealers’ mean-variance optimization problems. In Section 4.2, we charac-
terize the equilibrium in closed-form formulas in the case with two heteroge-
neous groups. In Section 4.3, we implement our model using empirical data.
In Section 4.4, we propose an optimal design of a CCP’s capital structure to
maximize its profit.
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4.1 Equilibrium of the CDS Inter-Dealer Mar-
ket
We consider a CDS market with n0 dealers. For each dealer i, let ψ
(i) be
the net client-dealer position of dealer i. A positive (resp. negative) value of
ψ(i) represents net long (resp. short) positions. We denote the market-wide
client-dealer positions by the vector
ψ = (ψ(1), ..., ψ(n0)) ∈ Rn0 . (4.1)
We assume that the client-dealer positions are static, given as initial inputs.
In order to partially hedge their CDS positions, dealers establish CDS
positions with peer dealers in the CDS inter-dealer market. We let φ(i) be the
inter-dealer position of dealer i within the inter-dealer market. Among all n0
dealers, the inter-dealer market positions are represented by the vector
φ = (φ(1), ..., φ(n0)) ∈ Rn0 . (4.2)




φ(i) = 0. (4.3)
To summarize, there are client-dealer positions ψ and inter-dealer market posi-
tions φ, but the inter-dealer market positions have to meet the market clearing
condition (4.3).
4.1.1 Design of the CCP’s Capital Structure
Since inter-dealer contracts have to be cleared with the CCP, dealers, as the
CCP’s clearing members, must post initial margins and guaranty funds. We let
IM (i) and GF (i) be dealer i’s initial margin and guaranty fund contribution,
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respectively. In practice, the initial margin is commonly set as the value-at-
risk (VaR) of the CDS portfolio. The CCP approximates the 5-day return
of dealer i’s position by the 5-day CDS spread return multiplied by the per-
contract notional value N and the absolute position |φ(i)|. In turn, the dealer
i’s initial margin imposed by the CCP is specified as
IM (i)(φ(i)) = cN |φ(i)|, (4.4)
where c is the initial margin level.1 The CCP has the freedom to choose the
initial margin level based on empirical data. For instance, the CCP may use
a parametric model that assumes a Gaussian distribution for the 5-day CDS
return, and set the initial margin level c as the 5-day volatility multiplied by
1.96 (99% quantile). Alternatively, the CCP may pick c proportional to the
99% quantile of the empirical 5-day CDS returns.
When dealer i defaults, the CCP has to find other participating dealers to
assume the positions of the defaulting dealer i by holding an auction. This
auction will determine the liquidation value of dealer i’s positions, and the
CCP will have to pay the auction winner(s) the cash amount
LC(i)(φ(i)) = bN |φ(i)|, (4.5)
where b is called the liquidation cost level. The constant b is usually determined
from historical CDS returns.
The liquidation cost will be partially covered by the defaulting dealer’s
initial margin. The remaining cost will be paid for by the guaranty fund in
the CCP. We name this amount the excess loss over margin associated with
dealer i. This excess loss over margin is very important in terms of systemic
risk, since it can indirectly affect other members’ wealth. Indeed, the CCP may
1More details on the market conventions can be found in the doc-
ument “CDS Clearing at ICE: A Unique Methodology” available at
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ice trust/FIA magazine CDS risk management article.pdf
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utilize others’ guaranty fund contributions to cover excess losses. Therefore,
regulators now require that the initial margin level c to be set between a lower
bound cmin > 0 and the upper bound b. As a result, the excess loss over
margin of dealer i is given by
EL(i)(φ(i)) = (b− c) N |φ(i)|, for c ∈ [cmin, b]. (4.6)
The Bank for International Settlements suggests that the total guaranty
fund, GF , be the maximum over all existing bilateral counterparties the sum
of two members’ excess losses conditioned on the two members’ simultaneous
default. As such, the total guaranty fund is defined by






This fund is obtained by clearing members’ contributions. A rule that is
currently adopted by many CCPs specifies the guaranty fund contribution of
dealer i by





Under this rule, the guaranty fund contribution is calculated based on individ-
ual and aggregate excess losses. One can interpret this rule as capturing each
clearing member’s contribution to systemic risk that triggers other members’
losses in extreme market situations. Also, note that dealer i’s guaranty fund
contribution is a function of the positions of all dealers φ in the inter-dealer
market.
In addition, the CCP charges a fee rate f for its clearing service. Dealer i’s
total amount of clearing fee is given by f N |φ(i)|. In summary, the design of
the CCP’s clearing mechanism can be described by the control variables: the
initial margin level c, the liquidation cost b, the clearing fee f .
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4.1.2 Mean-Variance Optimization of Dealers
We now turn to the dealers’ mean-variance optimization problems and deter-
mine their optimal clearing positions. For each dealer i, the 1-period return
of each CDS contract is given by the increment in the CDS spread. We model
the future CDS spread by a Gaussian random variable N (µ(i), σ2) with mean
µ(i) and variance σ2, and the current spread is denoted by ξ. Accounting for
dealer i’s total CDS positions (ψ(i) + φ(i)) and the notional value N , the total
return to dealer i is given by
(ψ(i) + φ(i))N N (µ(i) − ξ, σ2). (4.9)
Since every dealer has to post an initial margin and guaranty fund to the
CCP by cash or cash equivalent assets, a funding cost arises from depositing
the initial margin and guaranty fund, in addition to the clearing fee. In total,
we have
r(IM (i)(φ(i)) +GF (i)(φ)) + f |φ(i)|N, (4.10)
where r is funding cost rate over a single period.
Moreover, in the case of one or more participant dealers’ defaults, the
non-defaulting dealers may lose their guaranty fund contributions due to the
losses caused by the defaults while their initial margins are secure. As a
consequence, the presence of a CCP also introduces counterparty risk faced
by the member dealers. For each dealer i, we let random variable L(i) be the
loss of its guaranty fund contribution. We assume it is uniformly distributed
between 0 and GF (i)(φ) when such a loss occurs with probability p, namely,
L(i) =
Unif(0, GF
(i)(φ)) with probability p,
0 with probability 1− p.
(4.11)
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Combining (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12), the increment of dealer i’s wealth over
one period is given by
∆W (i) = (ψ(i) + φ(i))N (µ(i) − ξ, σ2)N − f |φ(i)|N − r(IM (i) +GF (i)(φ))− L(i).
(4.12)






where α(i) is the positive risk aversion parameter for dealer i. We denote the
dealers’ risk aversions by α = (α(1), ..., α(n0)). From (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12),
we get
E[∆W (i)] = (ψ(i) + φ(i))µ(i) − ξ N − f |φ(i)|N













Problem 4.1. (Mean-Variance Optimization) The optimal inter-dealer
position for dealer i, i = 1, . . . , n0, is given by
φ∗(i) = arg max
φ(i)




















We remark that the dealers solve their mean-variance optimization prob-
lems based on the inputs (b, c, f) that are specified by the CCP. As de-
fined in Section 4.1.1, dealer i’s guaranty fund contribution GF (i)(φ) depends
not only dealer i’s positions φ(i) but also others dealers’ positions φ·\(i) =
(φ(1), ..., φ(i−1), φ(i+1), ..., φ(n)).
Due to the anonymity of CDS transactions, each dealer does not know other
dealers’ positions. This lack of information may is more difficult for each dealer
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to compute its own optimal position. Hence, we impose the following standing
assumption.





Assumption 4.2 means that each dealer has the sufficient information its
guaranty fund contribution, even though the dealers do not know other dealers’
positions. This information can be supplied by the CCP without revealing the
identifies of dealers.
Next, we provide the solutions to the dealer’s mean-variance optimization
problems. To facilitate the notation, we denote GF (i)(φ(i)) ≡ GF (i)(φ).
Proposition 4.3. Dealer i’s mean-variance optimal position is given as fol-
lows.
1. The optimal clearing position is given by φ∗(i) = 0 if and only if






































= (µ(i) − ξ + f)N + r cN − α(i)σ2N2ψ(i), (4.15)
if and only if
ψ(i) >
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= (µ(i) − ξ − f)− r cN − α(i)σ2N2 ψ(i), (4.17)
if and only if
ψ(i) <








Corollary 4.4. The optimal clearing position of each dealer i, φ∗(i) is increas-
ing in µ(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n0.
In particular, if the market spread ξ increases, then every expected spread
return µ(i) − ξ decreases. This in turn reduces the dealer’s position φ∗(i).
4.1.3 Inter-Dealer Market Equilibrium
We now discuss the equilibrium in terms of the dealers’ clearing positions.
Given an arbitrary CDS spread ξ, we denote the inter-dealer market position
of dealer i by φ∗(i)(ξ, φ·\(i)). There are two requirements for the equilibrium of
dealers’ clearing positions. The equilibrium is obtained by solving the following
problem.
Problem 4.5. (Inter-Dealer Market Equilibrium) The equilibrium of
inter-dealer market positions (φ∗(1)(ξ∗), ..., φ∗(n0)(ξ∗)) and the equilibrium CDS
spread ξ∗ together satisfy




φ∗(i)(ξ∗, φ∗·\(i)) = 0. (4.19)
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Let us discuss the intuition behind this equilibrium problem. Given an




φ∗(i)(ξ, φ∗·\(i)) > 0,
this implies that there is a higher aggregate demand for long protection than
for short positions. Dealers will a demand for positive positions will offer to
pay at a higher CDS spread, which in turns triggers a higher demand for the
opposite positions. This will continue until the demand for long and short
positions are equal.
4.2 Two Heterogeneous Groups
In search of explicit solutions, we now assume that there exist only two het-
erogeneous groups representing protection buyers and protection sellers in the
inter-dealer market. Suppose there are n = n0/2 number of dealers in each
group. Within each group, the members are homogeneous with identical pa-
rameters. Across the two groups, dealers have the same risk aversion param-
eter α but all other parameters can differ. We define (φ∗(1), φ∗(2)) as an inter-
dealer market equilibrium where φ∗(i) is the equilibrium position for group
i ∈ {1, 2}. With only two groups, the market clearing condition is simplified
to φ∗(1) = −φ∗(2).
4.2.1 Inter-Dealer Market Equilibrium
The required initial margin for every dealer in both groups is IM (i) = |φ∗| cN ,
where φ∗ := φ∗(1). The total amount of guaranty fund is given by
GF (φ∗) = 2 max
1≤i,j≤2
{|φ∗(1)|+ |φ∗(2)|} (b− c)N = 2 |φ∗|(b− c)N.
CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY DESIGN ON
THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET 103








We are interested in the inter-dealer market equilibrium positions (φ∗,−φ∗).
In particular, we want to identify the condition under which a non-zero equi-
librium exists. Without loss of generality, we assume that
µ(1) − ασ2ψ(1) ≥ µ(2) − ασ2ψ(2), (4.20)
where the superscripts indicate the group number.
Theorem 4.6. (Two-Group Inter-dealer Market Equilibrium) The suf-




































The market equilibrium CDS spread ξ∗ is given by
ξ∗ =
µ(1) + µ(2) + αN σ2(ψ(1) + ψ(2))
2
.
Otherwise, the equilibrium position is trivial, i.e. φ∗ = 0, for every dealer in
both groups.
Alternatively, we can express the condition for the existence of a non-trivial
equilibrium in terms of the group size n.
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µ¯− f + αN σ2 ψ¯ − r c, (4.23)
and µ¯+ αN σ2ψ¯ > r c+ f, (4.24)
where µ¯ := (µ(1) − µ(2))/2 and ψ¯ := (−ψ(1) + ψ(2))/2.
Dealers use inter-dealer market contracts which have to be cleared in the
CCP only if the clearing benefit is greater than the other two factors, the
funding cost and counterparty risk.
This result provides a number of insights about the equilibrium. There are
three major factors affecting the dealers’ clearing positions: (1) the clearing
benefit, (2) the initial margin and guaranty fund contribution cost, and (3) the
counterparty risk. The condition (4.24) implies that dealers clear CDSs only
if the benefit of clearing (left-hand side) is greater than the funding cost of the
initial margin plus the clearing fee (right-hand side). The benefit perceived by
each dealer is increasing in the volatility of the CDS spread, the risk aversion
parameter, and the average client-dealer position in the market. However, this
condition alone may not be sufficient to trigger an inter-dealer market trade. A
minimum number of dealers is required to make the clearing benefit outweighs
the counterparty risk and funding cost generated by the dealers’ contribution
to the guaranty fund (see (4.23)). Consequentially, this guarantees a non-
trivial inter-dealer market equilibrium. To summarize,
• Dealers will clear only if the benefit of clearing outweighs the costs (see
(4.24)).
• If condition (4.24) holds, then dealers will clear only if a sufficient number
of members are present in the market (see (4.23)).
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4.2.2 Impact of Initial Margin Level Change on Equi-
librium
We now examine the effect of changing the initial margin level c on the equi-























)2) for c ∈ [0, b]. (4.25)
This result shows that the sign of the sensitivity is determined by the two
factors: the guaranty fund default probability p and funding rate r. On one
hand, an increase of the initial margin level decreases the exposure of clearing
members to defaults of other dealers. This counterparty risk effect pushes
the equilibrium demand up. Since the exposure is the amount of guaranty
fund contribution, this effect depends crucially on the guaranty fund default
probability p. On the other hand, an increase in the initial margin level raises
the total amount of required collateral, and thus, the cost of clearing. This
cost effect pushes the equilibrium demand down, and depends on the funding
rate r.
If the counterparty risk effect dominates the cost effect, the equilibrium
position increases as the initial margin level increases. Otherwise, the equilib-
rium position is reduced as the initial margin level decreases. We provide two
sufficient conditions that determine the direction of the impact.
Proposition 4.8. The equilibrium clearing position φ∗ is increasing in the
initial margin level c if
n ≤ 1 + p
2 r
. (4.26)
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The first condition (4.26) tends to hold if the guaranty fund default prob-
ability p is significantly higher than the funding rate r. This means that
dealers the counterparty risk outweighs the cost effect. When the CCP de-
creases the initial margin level c, the total funding cost of a dealer decreases
while the guaranty fund contribution and the corresponding counterparty risk
exposure of the dealer increases. As a consequence, the dealers seek to reduce
counterparty risk by reducing their inter-dealer market positions. The second
condition (4.27) corresponds to the case with sufficiently many dealers in the
market and low guaranty fund default probability p. In this scenario, when the
CCP increases the initial margin level c, the increase in total funding cost is
the driving factor that triggers the dealers to reduce their inter-dealer market
positions.
4.3 Numerical Results
In this section, we present some numerical results to illustrate our model.
We continue to assume the market with two heterogeneous groups with n = 5
dealers each. Following the statistics in Table 4.3, we assume that every dealer
in group 1 has $8.56B notional of client-dealer short positions and every dealer
in group 2 has $8.56B notional of client-dealer long positions. If we set the
notional of a CDS contract N = $10M, ψ(1) = −ψ(2) = −856. Drawing from
data of major clearing houses such as the Inter-continental Exchange (ICE),
and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), we set the liquidation cost level
b = 6% and the volatility of CDS price during the period, σ = 15%.
Corollary 4.7 gives the sufficient and necessary condition of the existence
of a non-zero equilibrium. As observed in the left panel of Figure 4.1, the
threshold of the number of clearing members in the CCP is less than one for
all risk aversion parameters. This means that for all 10 dealers will initiate
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Clearing Member Firm Short Positions Long Positions Net
Clearing Member 1 16,917 1,275 (15,642)
Clearing Member 2 14,497 1,605 (12,892)
Clearing Member 3 13,267 1,861 (11,406)
Clearing Member 4 923 17,228 16,305
Clearing Member 5 705 6,472 5,767
Clearing Member 6 2,527 8,194 5,667
Clearing Member 7 12,148 13,755 1,607
Clearing Member 8 4,911 2,065 (2,846)
Clearing Member 9 3,596 7,455 3,859
Clearing Member 10 6,999 16,580 9,581
Absolute Total 76,490 76,490 85,572
Table 4.1: The CDS gross notionals of clearing members (in US$ million) on
September 9th, 2009
inter-dealer trades and clear via the CCP. Moreover, as seen in the right panel
of Figure 4.1, as the dealer’s risk aversion increases, the equilibrium position
moves closer to the average number of client-dealer contracts ψ¯ = 856.
As shown in in Figure 4.2, the inter-dealer market equilibrium decreases
both in opportunity cost r and default probability p. Also note that in the
range of funding rate and guaranty fund default probability, the equilibrium
position decreases in initial margin level. The expected future CDS spreads of
two groups, µ(1) and µ(2), have the opposite impact on the equilibrium position.
As we observe from Figure 4.3, the equilibrium position is increasing in µ(1) and
decreasing in µ(2). Figure 4.4 shows that the the minimum number of dealers
in each group that guarantees the monotonicity of the equilibrium position
with respect to the initial margin level c (see (4.27)). In both panels, we see
that as long as there are two or more dealers in each group, the equilibrium
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Figure 4.1: The minimum number of dealers for a non-trivial equilibrium
The minimum number of dealers in each group (left) and the equilibrium posi-
tion (right) as a function of risk aversion. Other parameters: {µ(1)0 , µ(2)0 , r, p} =
{10bps,−10bps, 1%, 1%}.
positions are decreasing in the initial margin level.
4.4 Optimal Design of CCPs
We now consider from the CCP’s perspective and determine the optimal policy
that maximizes its revenue in the two-group setting. The CCP’s revenue is
the fee collected from all the clearing transactions of its clearing members,
that is, 2n|φ∗(i)|f . Recall that the design of a CCP is described the two
control variables c and f . They in turn affect the equilibrium positions of the
dealers, denoted by φ∗(i)(c, f), whose formula is given by (4.22). Under the
non-triviality condition (4.21), the CCP’s revenue maximization problem is
max
c,f












subject to cmin ≤ c ≤ b and f ≥ 0. (4.28)
In addition, if (4.26) holds, then the monotonicity result suggests that the
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium positions for different funding rates and guaranty fund
default probabilities
Left: The equilibrium positions for different funding rates r, with p fixed at 1%.
Right: The equilibrium positions for different guaranty fund default probabilities p,
with r = 1% fixed. Other parameters: {µ(1)0 , µ(2)0 , α} = {10bps,−10bps, 1.5× 10−5}.
















































Figure 4.3: The minimum number of dealers for a non-trivial equilibrium
The minimum number of dealers in each group (left) and the equilibrium position
(right) as a function of µ
(1)
0 . Other parameters {α, r, p} = {1.5× 10−5, 1%, 1%}.
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Figure 4.4: The minimum number of dealers in a group for condition (4.27)
The minimum number of dealers in each group that guarantees the mono-
tonicity of the equilibrium position with respect to the initial margin level
c. Left: {µ(1)0 , µ(2)0 , r, p} = {10bps,−10bps, 1%, 1%}. Right: {µ(1)0 , µ(2)0 , r, p} =
{−10bps, 10bps, 1%, 1%}.
optimal solution is c∗ = b. If (4.27) holds, then the optimal initial margin level



































Figure 4.5 illustrates the optimal initial margin level c∗ as a function of
guaranty fund default probability p and funding cost rate r. In the range
where p is less than 3%, the revenue-maximizing initial margin level c∗ is the
lowest admissible level cmin. Otherwise, the CCP will choose the upper bound
b as the initial margin level. The bottom panel of Figure 4.5 shows that the
optimal revenue is increasing as both r and p decrease.
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Figure 4.5: The CCP’s optimal margin level and optimal revenue
Top: The optimal initial margin level c∗. Bottom: The optimal revenue of the CCP.
Other parameters: {µ(1)0 , µ(2)0 , α} = {10bps,−10bps, 1.5× 10−5}.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.5
For w ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ) × D,R) and the operator M in (2.19), we define v ≡
v(t, s, x) by













Equation (A.1) admits the same form as (1.2) of Heath and Schweizer [2000].
By Theorem 1 of Heath and Schweizer [2000], v is a classical solution (C1,2([0, T )×
D,R)) of the PDE:
∂v(t, s, x)
∂t
+ Lv(t, s, x)− r˜(t, s, x) v(t, s, x) + f(t, s, x, w(t, s, x)) = 0 , (A.2)
for (t, s, x) ∈ [0, T )×D under certain conditions. To apply their result, we ver-
ify the sufficient conditions (A1),(A2),(A3′) and (A3a′)− (A3e′) in their Theo-
rem 1. The conditions (A1), (A2), (A3′) and (A3a′)−(A3c′) are identical to our
conditions (C1), (C2), (C4) and (C5)−(C6). Since w ∈ C1,2b ([0, T )×D,R), it is
Lipschitz-continuous on [0, T ]×D¯n, ∀n. Combined with condition (C7), it im-
plies that the composition (t, s, x) → f(t, s, x, w(t, s, x)) is uniformly Ho¨lder-
continuous on [0, T ]× D¯n×R, thus satisfying (A3d′). Lastly, the boundedness
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of v from Lemma 2.3 corresponds to (A3e′). Therefore, we conclude that v
is a bounded classical solution (i.e. C1,2b ([0, T )×D,R)) of the PDE (A.2) for
(t, s, x) ∈ [0, T )×D.
Now, let’s select the initial function P (0) ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]×D,R), e.g. P (0) = 0.
Then, the subsequent functions P (n) = MP (n−1), n = 1, 2, . . ., are also
C1,2b ([0, T ]×D,R) and satisfy the linear inhomogeneous PDE (2.22). By Propo-
sition 2.4, the contraction mappingM ensures the sequence (P (n)) to converge
to a unique fixed point P ∈ Cb([0, T )×D,R).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.8
First, we denote λ˜ := λ(1) + λ(2) and h˜(t, s) := h(t, s) + λ(0) l(t, s). Applying
the positive payoff to the definition of P b = P in (2.14), the MtM value with
CR provision is given by
P b(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+λ) (T−t) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t




(λ˜− α) e−(r+λ) (u−t)P b(u, Su) du
]
. (A.3)
To prove (2.33), we substitute it into the RHS of (A.3) and verify that it
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indeed reduces to (2.33). To this end, we get
P b(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+λ) (T−t) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t




(λ˜− α) e−(r+λ) (u−t)
{
e−(r+α+λ










































(0)) (u−t)h˜(u, Su) du
]
.
Since the last equality resembles (2.33), we conclude. The same steps will
yield the proof for expression (2.34).
To verify (2.35), we use the expressions of Π in (2.4) and P̂ b = P̂ in (2.15)
to get
P̂ b(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(r+λ)(T−t) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t




α e−(r+λ) (u−t) Π(u, Su) du+
∫ T
t




e−(r+λ)(T−t) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ) (u−t)h˜(u, Su) du−
∫ T
t























e−(r+λ) (u−t)h˜(u, Su) du+
∫ T
t












(0)) (u−t)h˜(u, Su) du
]
= Π(t, s)− Et,s
[∫ T
t
α e−(r+λ) (u−t) Π(u, Su) du
]
.
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Applying the same steps to the definition of P̂ s in (2.18), we obtain the equa-
tion (2.36).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.10
From (2.35) and (2.36) and the condition α, β ≥ 0, we obtain the inequalities
P̂ b(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s) and P̂ s(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s). The price expressions (2.33) and
(2.34) imply that




























Similar arguments give P s(t, s) ≤ Π(t, s). Hence, we conclude (2.39).
Next, applying the definition of P̂ b ≡ P̂ in (2.15) along with the inequality
(A.4), we get
P̂ b(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(T−t) (r+λ) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t








e−(T−t) (r+λ) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t




(λ˜− α) e−(u−t) (r+λ)P b(u, Su) du
]
= P b(t, s).
The last equality follows from the definition of P b in (2.14). From the definition
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of P̂ s in (2.18) and the inequality 0 ≤ P s ≤ Π in (2.39), we obtain
P̂ s(t, s) = Et,s
[
e−(T−t) (r+λ) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t








e−(T−t) (r+λ) g(ST ) +
∫ T
t




(λ˜− β) e−(u−t) (r+λ)P s(u, Su) du
]
= P s(t, s).
The last equality holds from the definition of P s in (2.16). Hence, we conclude
(2.40).
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3
We can solve this problem by treating the two cases, φ(i) ≤ 0 and φ(i) ≥ 0,
separately. Given that φ(i) ≤ 0, the maximization problem becomes
max
φ(i)

















subject to φ(i) ≤ 0.
The first order condition (FOC) condition implies that the optimal solution
φ∗(i) satisfies
















α(i)GF (i)(φ∗(i)) · ∂GF
(i)
∂φ(i)
(φ∗(i))− ν = 0 (FOC)
ν ≥ 0 (Dual Feasibility)
φ∗(i) ≤ 0 (Primary Feasibility)
ν · (φ∗(i)) = 0 (Complimentary Slackness)
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where ν is the Lagrangian multiplier. We can restate the FOC as




















The primary feasibility implies that RHS of (B.1) is always non-positive and
attains its maximum at φ∗ = 0. Therefore, if








we have φ∗(i) = 0, and the non-zero Lagrangian multiplier satisfies








Note that the RHS of (B.1) is strictly increasing in φ(i). Given that








we have a unique solution φ∗(i) that satisfies the equation




















and the Lagrangian multiplier ν = 0.
Similar to the first case, if








we have φ∗(i) = 0. Otherwise, there is a unique solution φ∗(i) satisfying the
equation
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.6
The market clearing condition (4.19) implies that it is enough to solve the
following system of two equations to get the inter-dealer market equilibrium
by using (4.15) and (4.17) for φ∗ = (φ∗(1), φ∗(2)) :
(µ(1) + ξ∗ − f − r c)N − α(1)σ2N2 ψ(1)























(µ(2) + ξ∗ − f + r c)N − α(2)σ2N2 ψ(2)

























(δ − c σ)
n
φ∗, i = 1, 2.
For simplicity, if we assume that α(1) = α(2) = α then
(µ(1) + ξ∗ − r c)N − ασ2N2ψ(1) = −(µ(2) + ξ∗ + r c)N + ασ2N2ψ(2)
or equivalently,
ξ∗ =
µ(1) + µ(2) + αN σ2(ψ(1) + ψ(2))
2
.























Otherwise, we have a trivial solution, φ∗ = 0.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.8
When the condition in (4.26) is satisfied, the partial derivative in (4.25) is
positive for all c ∈ [0, b]. This implies that φ∗ is increasing in c. Hence, we
conclude the first assertion.
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when we require n to be positive. From (4.22), we know that
φ∗ ≤ ψ¯ + µ¯
σ2 αN
.






















8 b (µ¯+ αNψ¯σ2)
r σ2
)
so that φ∗ is decreasing in c. Thus, the second part of Proposition 4.8 is
proven.
